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Abstract
This thesis examines the problem of having an intelligent agent reasoning about inter-
action with users in real-time decision making environments. Our work is motivated by the
models of Fleming and Cheng, which reason about interaction sensitive to both expected
quality of decision (following interaction) and cost of bothering users. In particular, we
are interested in dynamic, time critical scenarios. This leads first of all to a novel process
known as strategy regeneration, whereby the parameter values representing the users and
the task at hand are refreshed periodically, in order to make effective decisions about which
users to interact with, for the best decision making. We also introduce two new parameters
that are modeled: each user’s lack of expertise (with the task at hand) and the level of
criticality of each task. These factors are then integrated into the process of reasoning
about interaction to choose the best overall strategy, deciding which users to ask to resolve
the current task. We illustrate the value of our framework for the application of decision
making in hospital emergency room scenarios and offer validation of the approach, both
through examples and from simulations. To sum up, we provide a framework for reasoning
about interaction with users through user modeling for dynamic environments. In addi-
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In this thesis, we explore the problem of reasoning about interaction between an intelligent
agent and a user, in scenarios that are dynamic and time critical. An intelligent agent is
a software agent that has been designed to problem solve on behalf of its user, given a
user goal and preferences, and knowledge of the environment in which it is operating. In
particular, we develop a decision-theoretic framework for deciding when an agent should
enlist the problem solving assistance of a user, considering both the expected quality of
decision and the possible cost of bothering the user.
As a motivating example, consider the following (from [11]):
Suppose a user wants to know which path to choose in order to minimize travel time
but is unsure whether there are any traffic snarls on the two possible routes. The
intelligent agent may be privy to additional knowledge about these routes (though
there is uncertainty introduced, since its information is not guaranteed to be accu-
rate).
The user may choose to pick one of the two paths based on his or her knowledge alone,
without consulting the intelligent agent. But in cases where the user’s confidence in
its ability to decide is low and where its confidence in the agent’s ability to decide is,
at least, higher, it may choose to consult the agent.
In the following scenario the agent faces uncertainty and could benefit from informa-
tion gathering. An earthquake occurred, and there are fires raging throughout the
city. An assistant agent attached to a fire brigade is tasked with finding a route that
its fire brigade can take to quickly get to a fire.
1
Suppose the agent computes two feasible routes, Route1 and Route2. Route1 is the
most direct path to the fire, but requires crossing a bridge. Unfortunately, due to the
earthquake, the agent is uncertain about traveling over the bridge, as it may have
collapsed from the quake. If the bridge did indeed collapse, then the agent will need
to take a costly detour to get to the fire. On the other hand, Route2 is an indirect
path that does not involve crossing any bridge.
In this scenario, a relevant query that the agent could ask is Q1 = “Is the bridge
condition good enough to travel on?”, with the possible answer responses being r1,1 =
BG (bridge condition good), and r1,2 = BB (bridge condition bad). With this
information, the agent should be able to make a more informed decision and a wiser
choice of route. Without the information, the agent can still choose what it feels is
the best action to take, given the information that it has to date.
Previous research has examined what is referred to as mixed-initiative systems: partner-
ships between users and intelligent agents, where either party may take the initiative to
direct the problem solving or the interaction [11]. This research emphasized the impor-
tance of user modeling in the determination of whether an intelligent agent, charged with
performing the problem solving autonomously, should in fact interrupt the user in order
to offload the decision making.
In environments where there are multiple agents representing multiple users, all of
whom are cooperating towards the completion of some goal, the challenge is referred to as
adjustable autonomy [26]. Now each intelligent agent has a variety of possible users whose
assistance may be engaged and the question is not only whether a user should be bothered
but instead which user should be approached. One valuable approach to resolving the
adjustable autonomy challenge is proposed in the work of Tambe et al. referred to as the
Electric Elves project [27]. In this research, each agent calculates a preferred strategy: a
series of other entities (users or agents) that may be asked, at which point in time, followed
by other entities who will then be asked if the first party does not respond, through to a
final strategy state which is typically having the agent perform the decision making itself.
As an example to illustrate the reasoning that an agent may undergo when determining
who should be approached to take over the decision making of a current task, consider the
following scenario from [6]:
In this scenario, a meeting has been scheduled. Ed, the presenter for an upcoming group
meeting, has to cancel the meeting. The agent is charge of organizing meetings
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is then tasked with finding an appropriate time slot to reschedule the meeting. It
can either make the decision itself, ask Ed to make the decision or in fact ask Bob,
the team leader, to make the decision. Which user to ask would be dependent on
expected quality of decision from that user, as well as likelihood of a response. An
overall strategy may be as expressed as follows: Bob(5)Ed(10)Agent meaning that
Bob will be asked to make the decision, the agent will wait 5 time units for a response
and if one is not received, Ed will be asked and another 10 time units will pass, at
which time the agent will just make the decision itself.
As an improvement to the approach of Tambe, Cheng developed a framework for ad-
justable autonomy multiagent systems which integrated not only a method for reasoning
about which entity should perform the decision making but also a method for reasoning
about interaction: asking users questions first, to then better direct the decision making
process [6]. In this framework, overall strategies for asking entities either for information
(partial transfers of control) or to perform decision making (full transfers of control) are
generated and evaluated, with the strategy that maximizes the overall utility being se-
lected. As with Fleming’s approach [11], one critical element in the reasoning is the cost of
bothering a user, modeled in terms of a set of formulae that integrate several elements of
user modeling (such as the user’s inherent willingness to assist and his or her attentional
state).
Distinct challenges arise, however, when the environment in which the reasoning is
performed is coping with critical tasks that must be completed in a timely manner, and
where there is a good deal of dynamic change. One such environment is that of decision
making for emergency rooms in hospitals. If an intelligent system were to be running,
calculating which experts would be best to contact to assist with the current patients,
modeling the expected improvement in decision making as well as the likelihood of response
(sensitive to the bother that would be generated), then improved overall decision making
could result.
The challenge of effective hospital decision making motivates the development of the
models presented in this thesis. Our overall approach consists of two primary components.
The first is a general framework for reasoning about strategies to generate and to select,
in order to approach the best users to perform decision making. Due to the demands of
time critical decision making in the face of dynamic change, novel elements need to be
developed, beyond the framework proposed by Cheng [6]. In our research, we focus on the
issue of reasoning with up-to-date parameter values and we propose a technique referred
to as strategy regeneration. In particular, we outline (in Chapter 3, Section 3.1) how this
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element may be integrated (in Chapter 4) into an overall framework like that of Cheng’s,
and we demonstrate through a series of examples (in Chapter 5) the inherent value of this
technique, compared to the case where strategies are not regenerated.
The second component of our research is extended user modeling, to enable more ef-
fective decision making. For this task, we focus specifically on the scenario of emergency
room patient care and outline the kinds of parameters which, when modeled, would lead to
improved decisions about which experts to ask to assist for patients (in Chapter 3, Section
3.2). The value of our particular approach is discussed some simulated hospital scenarios
(in Chapter 4 and Chapter 5), where patients who are not attended to effectively may
become a problem for the hospital.
In Chapter 6, we discuss the value of our research both in advancing research on in-
telligent interaction for artificial intelligent systems and in assisting with emergency room
decision making. In addition, we chronicle a large number of interesting future paths with
this research, to expand its scope and to enrich its models. We conclude with a list of the




In this chapter, we introduce some terminology and present some foundational related
work.
2.1 Agents and Multiagent Systems
In artificial intelligence, an intelligent agent (IA) is defined as an autonomous entity that
observes and acts upon an environment and directs its activity in order to achieve its
goals [25].
Multiagent systems are defined as follows: “... systems in which several interacting,
intelligent agents pursue some set of goals or perform some set of tasks.”[29] In addition,
Weiss [29] emphasizes the value of interaction in multiagent system, as follows:
“To build a multiagent system in which the agents “do what they should do” turns out
to be particularly difficult ... The only way to cope with these characteristics is to enable
the agents to interact appropriately.”
2.2 Mixed-initiative Systems
Mixed-initiative systems are ones in which a system (i.e. an intelligent agent) and users
form a problem solving partnership, where either party is able to take the initiative to
solve the problem. Haller and McRoy [13] describe mixed-initiative systems as follows: “In
a problem-solving situation, the information and abilities needed for the task at hand are
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often distributed among the collaborators. As a result, direction and control of the inter-
action shifts among the participants. If future computational systems are to collaborate
effectively with users to solve problems, they must have the ability to take and relinquish
control of the problem-solving process and the communication about it. The theory and
the mechanisms that underlie these behaviors are ... computational models for mixed
initiative interaction.”
2.3 Fleming’s Model for Mixed-Initiative Systems
A model for determining the interaction between the system and the user in a mixed-
initiative system is presented in [11]. This work forms the starting point for our own
research and is described below.
2.3.1 Reasoning about Interaction
Fleming & Cohen [11, 12] developed a domain-independent decision-theoretic model for
an agent to reason about whether or not it should interact with a human user. The
model is aimed at solving ‘single decision’ problems, defined as “from an initial state, the
system decides about interacting with the user, then makes a decision about what action
to perform and then takes that action to complete the task” [12].
The general algorithm for a system to reason about whether or not it should ask a
question is fairly intuitive, and proceeds as follows (as presented by [12]):
1. Determine the expected benefits of interacting with the user. More specifically, de-
termine by how much the system’s performance on the task is expected to improve
(if at all) after asking the user the question.
2. Determine the expected costs of the interaction.
3. Proceed with the interaction only if the benefits exceed the costs.
The computation of the benefits of interaction is simply Benefits = EUask − EU¬ask,
where EUask represents the expected utility of an agent’s decision using information ob-
tained from the user, while EU¬ask represents the expected utility of an agent’s decision
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made without any more information. Note that the expected utility denoted here does not
incorporate the costs incurred, but rather refers only to the value of the decision.
The value of EU¬ask is the expected utility of the action that the agent believes to be
the most promising in the current state, given the information it has without asking the




For each possible action a, the expected utility calculation takes into account the fact
that there may be uncertainty about the possible outcomes of the action. For any given
action a, suppose there are several possible results, each denoted resi, with probability




P (resi) · U(resi) (2.2)
To compute the value of EUask, let PUR denote the probability that the user responds
and let EUUR be the expected utility that the agent could achieve if it receives an answer
from the user. If the user does not respond or says that he does not know the answer, the
agent will choose the action it believes to be the best, with expected utility EU¬ask.
EUask = PUR · EUUR + (1− PUR) · EU¬ask (2.3)
Here, EUUR is computed by considering all possible responses rj that the user could





P (rj) · EU(aj | rj) (2.4)
The computation of interaction costs is done through a linear model, where the total
cost is a weighted sum of individual costs; i.e., Costs =
∑
iwiCi. Two costs considered in
Fleming & Cohen’s work are the cost of the time required to interact with the user, and
the cost of bothering the user1. This research clearly outlines where a model of bother cost
can be introduced into the process of reasoning about interaction.
1[11] also discusses briefly the cost of carrying out certain queries, such as costs in fetching from
databases.
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Bother cost is in fact included as a key factor in determining whether or not an agent
will interact with a human user. How to model bother cost is discussed in greater detail
in Section 2.3.2, below.
2.3.2 Bother Cost Model
There are two main principles to Fleming’s bother cost model. The first is the idea that
“recent interruptions and diffcult questions should carry more weight than interruptions
in the distant past and very straightforward questions.” The second is the notion that
whether a user is willing to interact with the system is a critical factor to reason about, in
order to avoid bothering the user too much. Fleming’s model is as follows:
• First estimate how bothersome the dialogue has been so far. This bother so far (BSF)
is given by BSF =
∑
I c(I) × βt(I), where the system computes the sum over all
the past interactions with the user (including the currently considered interaction).
c(I) is how bothersome the interaction was (e.g., cognitive effort required by the
user to answer the question), t(I) is the amount of time that has passed since that
interaction, and β is a discount factor that diminishes the effect of past interactions
as time passes.
• Let w represent the user willingness, with a range of 0 to 10, with higher w meaning
more willingness.
• Let α = 1.26−0.05w and Init = 10−w. Here, Init is to reflect the cost of bothering
a user for the first time.
• Then, BotherCost = Init + 1−α
BSF
1−α . From this formulation, a lower willingness w
results in a higher Init cost, and also a higher α value (which amplifies the effect of
the bother so far BSF ). As BSF increases, so too does BotherCost, but at different
rates, depending on the α value. As shown by [11], for low w values, α will be greater
than 1, and we will see an exponential-like increase due to BSF , while for high w
values, α will be less than 1, and we see a log-like increase. The values used for the




Adjustable autonomy multiagent systems are ones in which any agent can offload decision
making of its current task to a user or to another agent [14]. In this section, we give an
overview of the Electric Elves (E-Elves) project which represents a agent-based adjustable
autonomy model. This model inspired that of Cheng [6], on which our own model is based.
2.5 The Electric Elves (E-Elves) Project
Research by Tambe et al. [27] at ISI/USC explored the challenge of adjustable autonomy
multiagent systems – allowing agents involved in completing tasks on behalf of users to
transfer decision making control to another entity in the environment, where an entity
would either be another agent or one of the human users.
Whereas previous research on adjustable autonomy systems led to a decision of the
agent to retain decision making control or to transfer it to a single entity in the environment,
Tambe et al. proposed the concept of a transfer-of-control strategy: a planned sequence
of transfer-of-control actions. In this case, there is a plan to ask a particular entity but
to wait a certain period of time before then asking a different entity, through to the end
of the planned sequence. For example, the transfer-of-control strategy U1(5) U2(10) Agent
would have the Agent attempting to offload decision making to User1, waiting until time 5,
then asking User2 and waiting until time 10, at which time the Agent itself would take on
the decision making. The central problem to resolve is to determine which of the possible
strategies maximizes the expected utility of the overall decision2. In order to determine
the best strategies, agents reason with a set of parameters and estimations of their values,
including EQde, the expected quality of decision made by the entity being asked and, P (t),
the probability that the entity will respond with a decision of that expected quality.
2.5.1 Definitions
At this point, it is useful to record various definitions from Tambe’s model [27], as follows:
Transfer-of-Control A transfer-of-control strategy is a planned sequence of transfer-of-
control actions, including both those that actually transfer control and those that
2Utility is a concept in artificial intelligence aimed at modeling the inherent value of an action for a
user, relative to their goals and preferences
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simply buy more time to get input.
An agent An agent, A, is responsible for making a decision, d.
Entities There are n entities, e1, ..., en, who can potentially make the decision. These
entities can be human users, other agents, or the agent itself.
EQ(t) The expected quality (EQ) of a decision, d, made by an entity, e, at time, t, is
given by EQde(t) : < → <.
P(t) The continuous probability distribution over time that the entity, e, in control will
respond with a decision of quality at time, t is given by: P>(t) : < → <.
W(t) The cost of delaying a decision until time t is W (t) : < → <. W (t) is assumed to
be non-decreasing and that there is some point in time, C, when the costs of waiting
stop accumulating (i.e., ∀t > C,W (t) = W (C)).
2.5.2 Expected Utility
In the Electric Elves model, the expected utility is calculated by multiplying the probabil-
ity of response by the expected utility at each instant of time and summing the products.








where ec denotes the entity currently in decision making control.






2.6.1 Reasoning about Interaction
We begin with a brief overview of Cheng’s model for reasoning about interaction [6], before
proceding to present our variation for the time-critical environment of hospital decision
making. Cheng [6] extends the Electric Elves model to allow each agent to reason about
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initiating information gathering interaction with a user before determining what to do
next. This adjustable autonomy model is described in detail below. In this work, Cheng
differentiates between the agent querying an entity for information which he refers to as
a partial transfer-of-control or PTOC, and the agent asking an entity to make a decision
which we refer to as a full transfer-of-control or FTOC. Both of these cases are considered
to be interaction from the agent to the entity. This yields overall what he refers to as a
hybrid transfer-of-control strategy.
Below are descriptions of an FTOC and a PTOC node.
FTOC An FTOC node represents the agent fully transferring control to some entity at
some time point ti and waiting until time point ti+1 for a response. For simplicity’s
sake, we regard the case of the agent deciding autonomously as an FTOC to the
agent itself. Note that for this special FTOC case, we do not need to plan for any
transfers afterwards because the decision will definitely have been made.
PTOC A PTOC node represents the agent partially transferring control by asking some
entity a query at some time point ti+1 for a response. Each possible response to a
query will be represented as a branch from the PTOC node to a strategy subtree
representing what the agent should do when it receives that particular response.
There are several terminologies to describe a PTOC node. For example, a particular query
is denoted as Qj, and its possible answer responses are denoted as rj,1, rj,2, ..., and rj,n. In
addition, rj,? is included to represent “I don’t know” and rj,¬resp is to represent the ‘no
response’ case which occurs when the entity does not respond in time.
Figure 2.1 revisits the meeting scheduling scenario introduced in Chapter 1 and illus-
trates an example hybrid TOC strategy where the agent is responsible for rescheduling a
presentation meeting time. In this interaction strategy, the agent is not sure which factor
should be prioritized when selecting a meeting time. Thus, the agent does a PTOC to
the group leader Bob, asking query Q1=“When rescheduling a meeting time, which factor
should be prioritized?”, with the possible answer responses being r1,1=“Prioritize having
the meeting earlier”, r1,2= “Prioritize having the meeting be convenient for the presenter”,
r1,?=“I have no idea”, and r1,¬resp=No response.
The response from Bob will determine the job the agent will do. If the response is
r1,1, we simply move to the FTOC node, and the agent figures that it is relatively capable
enough to make the decision by itself and decides autonomously. If the response is r1,? or
r1,¬resp, then the agent just tries to make the best decision it can.
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Figure 2.1: Example Hybrid TOC Strategy.
If the response is r1,2, then the agent figures that the presenter Ed, is much more
capable of making a good decision, and so does an FTOC to Ed, asking Ed to make the
meeting time decision and waiting until time T2 for the response. If time T2 arrives and
Ed still has not responded back, then the agent will just decide by itself.
Reasoning about this interaction in fact requires an effective model of bother cost as
well. The challenge is for each agent to determine its optimal TOC strategy, by generating
possible strategies, evaluating the expected utility of the strategies and then selecting the
one with the highest expected utility. The use of the term “utility” here is consistent with
that used in E-Elves and reflects the difference between the benefits and costs.
The expected utility of a strategy s is, in turn, dependent on the expected utility of all
the leaf nodes in s.3




[P (LNl)× (EQ(LNl)−W (TLNl)−BCLNl)] (2.5)
In the equation, EQ(LNl) denotes the expected quality of the agent’s decision at leaf
node LNl, given the information it has gathered along the path to LNl. W (TLNl) denotes
3Note that, in this Section, only two strategies were considered for the agent: it could ask the user a
question (with expected utility EUask) or it could proceed with its reasoning without the user’s help (with
expected utility EU¬ask). The benefits of asking were calculated by computing EUask − EU¬ask, and
these benefits were then compared to the costs of interaction. In the model in this section, the expected
utility of many possible interaction strategies, with both the benefits and costs incorporated into a single
expected utility measure, EU(s).
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the costs of waiting until the time of leaf node LN1 to finish the interaction.
4, and BCLNl
denotes the bother cost accumulated from interacting with entities from all the trans-
fers that the agent has done up to (and including) the current transfer-of-control under
consideration.
The expected utility of the overall strategy is in effect the sum of the utility of each of
the individual paths in it; thus, one needs to factor in the probability that the particular
path will be taken P (LN l). This in turn will depend as well on the probability of response.
2.6.2 Bother Cost Model
Cheng offers an equation for modeling the cost of bothering a user that is user-specific and
incorporates several important elements as follows:
• The difficulty of the interruption query, TOC Base Bother Cost. For example, usu-
ally asking a user his/her preference is easier (i.e., cognitively less intense) than asking
a user to decide on a plan of action.
• The attention state of the user, Attention State Factor. For instance, a user is more
interruptible when resting than when he/she is busy with important work.
• The user’s unwillingness to interact with the system, User Unwillingness Factor(UUF )
(0.5 ≤ UUF ≤ 2). This is a measure of how receptive (or rather, unreceptive) the
user is towards being TOC’ed, and how disrupted they are by interruptions. Cheng
chooses to model user unwillingness factor, rather than willingness in order to make
the overall calculations more intuitive. As User Unwillingness Factor increases,
the value of bother cost increases.
• The timings of the interruptions, t(TOC), and the discount factor, β (0 < β < 1),
which reduces the bother impact of past TOCs as time passes.
The formulae below then specify the bother cost calculation:
• Init = User Unwillingness Factor × Attention State Factor×
TOC Base Bother Cost
4Note that W (t) is introduced in the E-Elves model as well and is intended to represent the cost of
waiting in order to get the task completed, with respect to the need for the actions to be carried out
quickly within the domain of application.
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Figure 2.2: Graph showing how much bother cost increases due to bother so far, for the
different user willingness types.
• BSF (Bother So Far) =
∑
toc∈PastTOC TOC Base Bother Cost(toc)× βt(toc), where
PastTOC is the set of all the past TOCs experienced by the user,
TOC Base Bother Cost(toc) is just the TOC Base Bother Cost of toc, and t(toc)
is the time point at which toc occurred.
• To determine the increase to the bother cost due to BSF , there is a function,
BC Inc Fn(BSF,User Unwillingness), that maps a BSF value to a bother cost
increase, based on the user’s unwillingness level.
• BotherCost (BC) = Init+BC Inc Fn(BSF,User Unwillingness).
In addition, Cheng suggests possible bother cost factor values as follows:
• [TOC Base Bother Cost] Easy=5, Medium=10, Hard=20
• [Attention State Factor] Relaxed=0.75, Neutral=1, Busy=1.25
• [User Unwillingness Factor] Willing=0.5, Neutral=1, Unwilling=2
• [β] 0.90
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• [BC Inc Fn] For Willing, BC Inc Fn(x) = x0.75, for Neutral, BC Inc Fn(x) = x1,
for Unwilling, BC Inc Fn(x) = x1.25. This gives us roughly the same bother cost
shape as used by [11] and [2]. Figure 2.2 shows how the bother cost increases due to
bother so far, for the different user willingness types.
2.6.3 Strategy Selection
Cheng provides algorithms to generate all possible strategies, choosing the one with the
highest expected utility. This strategy is then executed and various entities are either
asked questions or asked to take over decision making. This process is sensitive to both
the expected quality of decision and the cost of bothering as the two primary factors to
consider.
2.7 Hospital Background
A network of researchers in computer science, engineering, nursing and medicine is cur-
rently involved in a project aimed at providing effective decision making support in various
healthcare contexts, including that of the hospital setting, in a project known as hSITE
(Healthcare Support Through Information Technology Enhancements)[22]. The central
aim of this project is to be able to employ the right person, at the right time, with the
right information, for more effective healthcare. Specific challenges arise in the emergency
room setting, in particular5.
In general, in hospital emergency room scenarios, a patient arrives and is seen by the
ER triage nurse, who determines to what section of the ER the patient should go to. The
triage nurse has experience to decide whether the patient needs to be in acute, sub-acute,
fast-track section or resuscitation room. After this is determined, the first patient goes
to the respective section and is taken care of and assessed again, by an ER nurse, then a
Nurse practitioner/ER resident/doctor. If a patient is coming in with a condition that is
obvious and needs a specialist, then the nurse would proceed to call the specific specialist
right away, e.g., a brain injury triggers a call for a neurologist. If a condition is not obvious,
through further assessments with the nurse, nurse practitioner, and ER doctor, it would
be determined which specialist service to call.
5This scenario was outlined for us by health professionals associated with the strategic research health
network known as hSITE [22].
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If the patient being brought in by Emergency Medical Services is critical, they are
brought into the resuscitation room right away, and nurses assigned to that room attend
to the patient, as well as an ER doctor. From there it is determined if other specialities
are called. If a patient is being brought in presenting with a stroke, for example, and the
triage nurses are notified beforehand, the triage nurses call the specialists for thrombolytic
therapy immediately as this therapy is time sensitive. In some hospitals, an urgency level
is determined for each patient in the ER and is kept on record for the patient.
Without consideration of the possible bother being incurred when experts are solicited
(so merely focusing on who might have the best expertise for the problem at hand) what
results is a significant bottleneck in the effective delivery of the care to the patient. Espe-
cially with patients in critical conditions, it is important to make very effective decisions
about who should be consulted. In addition, the parameters that serve to model the pa-
tients are constantly changing in this dynamic setting, and reasoning needs to be sensitive
to this as well.
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Chapter 3
Our Framework for Reasoning about
Dynamic, Time-Critical Interaction
3.1 Decision Making Element
We introduce a model that can be used specifically for scenarios where an agent is reasoning
about which human users to enlist to perform decision making, in an environment where
decisions need to be made under critical time constraints and where the parameters that
serve to model the human users are changing dynamically, to a significant extent.
Transfer-of-control strategies are generated in order for the optimal strategy to be
selected for execution. Within the transfer-of-control strategy, one user after another is
expected to respond, should there be no response from the previous user after a certain
extent of time. In contrast to the approach in Section 2.6, attempts at full transfers of
control are in fact framed as PTOCs with the question Q: “Can you take over the decision
making?”. This then enables both a “yes” response, which results in an FTOC to this user
or a “no” response (or silence)1. Note that, distinct from Cheng [6], we are not reasoning
about which questions to ask a user; we are focused on asking this particular question, to
drive the decision making.
The “no” response brings up a new approach to the dynamically changing environment
and the challenge of time. There is a new generation of possible strategies in anticipation
of other potential experts who may be suitable to help, and the transfer-of-control attempt
ends. The regeneration is useful in overcoming possible challenges where choices that are
1The case of silence in our model corresponds to the case of r1,¬resp in Section 2.6.1
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Figure 3.1: Visual representation of strategy with the FTOCs and PTOCs; each world
occupies one square.
less than optimal can be unappealing. It helps to reevaluate the users who are available
to help in terms of their decisions and bother costs, and the best users to enlist can be
recomputed.
The approach that is followed when there is silence projects continued attempts to
contact other users. At the end of this chain of attempts, we inject a final decision of
strategy regeneration2. Strategy regeneration will then allow for an updating of parameter
values. Note that in our current model, we make the simplification that the strategies do
not involve asking different entities within the same chain. This is because we are limiting
ourself to only one question, that of asking the expert to help. We revisit this restriction
in Section 6.1.9.
A diagram outlining the FTOCs and the PTOCs that we envisage is presented in Figure
3.1 where an arrow with a solid line means the stream of time, but a dotted line means
there is no break by the end of the arrow. In addition, we introduce a concept of world
to facilitate the computation of the utility of any given strategy. One world consists of
one PTOC, one FTOC, and one SG (Strategy Regeneration) node and includes all the
parameters currently used to calculate benefits and costs to reason about interaction with
entities. Therefore, when the current world is moved to the next step, our system asks
a new entity. The number of worlds is equivalent to the number of entities that will be
asked. The SG node is clarified as follows:
2This is in contrast to the general approach provided in Section 2.6.1, where the final node in a chain is
usually one where there is a full transfer-of-control back to the agent, who must then perform the decision.
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SG Node The expected utility of a SG node (sg) is just EU(sg) = 0 as the EU of a
PTOC node is zero, Cheng [6] clarifies that PTOCs have zero utility because this is
instead computed at the final FTOC node of the strategy. This is because a decision
is never made in a SG. The power of the SGs is that they allow a strategy chain to
be regenerated. We encounter a SG node when the response from an entity is “No”
or after an entire chain of silence, to the end of the strategy. Strategy regeneration
allows us to then reflect current parameter values.
3.1.1 Algorithm for Finding Optimal Strategy
The procedure for the agent to find the optimal strategy is a basic branch and bound
search, where the agent generates all possible strategies, containing one query, evaluates the
generated strategies, and then simply selects the one with the highest expected utility value.
The strategy generation and evaluation steps are described below. Our procedure differs
from that of Cheng [6] in its manner of generating and evaluating strategies containing
FTOCs, PTOCs, and SG nodes.
3.1.2 Strategy Generation
The basic idea is that we will generate all possible strategies containing one query. As
Cheng mentioned [6], we can visualize a strategy as a tree as displayed in Figure 2.1,
composed of FTOC nodes and PTOC nodes, but in our framework SG nodes are inserted
into the tree as well.
In our model, we assume that we are not considering strategies which involve the same
entity more than once but are considering all possible entities. Thus, using this analogy,
the length of the strategy is then the maximum depth of the tree, which is the number of
entities.
Let E be the set of all relevant entities in the system. Let FN be the set of all possible
FTOC nodes. Each FTOC node (fn) identifies which entity e in E to fully transfer control
to. Let SG be the set of all possible SG nodes. Another strategy is generated at the SG
node (sg). Let PN be the set of all possible PTOC nodes. The set PN consists of all the
possible pairings between a query q and entity e in E. So, each PTOC node (pn) identifies
which entity to ask which query. Also, each pn has branches corresponding to the possible
responses to query q, and each of these branches will have an attached strategy subtree.
With n possible entities, we obtain n! strategies.
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Using this model formulation, we show an algorithm for generating strategies, as below:
1: procedure GenerateStrategy(int i) . i represents the length of the strategy
chain to generate
2: if (i = 1) then . Base Case
3: create a PTOC node
4: create strategy by appending FTOC and SG node to the PTOC node
5: else if (i = the number of entities) then
6: create a Default node
7: create strategy by appending Default node to Si
8: else
9: Si−1 ← GenerateStrategy(i− 1) . Get the set of strategies of length i-1
10: create a PTOC node, a FTOC node, and a SG node
11: create strategy by appending the PTOC node to the PTOC in Si−1
12: create strategy by appending the FTOC and SG node to the PTOC node
which has been just created
13: end if
14:
15: return set of all newly created strategies
16: end procedure
3.1.3 Strategy Evaluation
The formulae that would be used to reason about the expected utility derived from a
strategy are explained below. As outlined in Section 2.3, the optimal strategy is determined
by evaluating the expected utility (EU) of each of the generated strategies and selecting
the one with the highest EU value. As explained in [6], a strategy generation phase would
begin with the simplest strategies (of length one) and then expand to longer strategies
by adding an FTOC or a PTOC node to previously generated strategies. The strategy
generation is then limited by bounding the maximal length of strategy. For the model of
reasoning presented in this section, we limit the strategy generation based on the number
of entities under consideration. If there are k entities, k! strategies are generated, among
which we choose the one with the highest EU value. Then, the overall EU of strategy s is
computed by taking the sum of the EU of all the leaf nodes in s.
Considering the calculation for the expected utility of a strategy as the sum of the
utilities of the leaf nodes in that strategy we then proceed to calculate separately the
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utility of a) ending in a full transfer-of-control b) ending in a strategy regeneration from a
“no” response c) going down a path of “silence”3 to a final stage of strategy regeneration.
Note as well that here the probability that a transfer-of-control is occurring is dependent on
the probability that all the PTOC nodes prior to this one are silence and on the probability
of the response associated with this node (“yes”, “no” or silence).
Below are the equations to calculate EU for the three cases having different a leaf
node: “yes” , “no”, and silence. If the response is “yes”, the leaf node of the path from the
initial PTOC node is an FTOC node. The EU of an FTOC node (fnl) in the jth world




P {resp=Silence}eprev × P
{resp=Y es}
ei
× (EQdei −W (te − ts)−BCfnl) (3.1)
where EUj(fnl) denotes the expected utility in the jth world of full transfer-of-control;
pnprev denotes a partial transfer to entity eprev; P
{resp=Silence}
eprev denotes the probability that
asking all the previous entities the query will result in silence; P
{resp=Y es}
ei denotes the




expected quality of decision, d the entity ei has; W (te − ts) denotes the cost of waiting
a decision between time ts and te. Cheng [6] suggested that the cost of waiting is a
increasing function. Since our model is for time-critical scenario, the cost of waiting should
be increased rapidly as time progresses.
te is the ending time of the FTOC (so where the arrow meets the FTOC square in
Figure 3.1); ts is the starting time of the FTOC, (so where the arrow heading into the FTOC
square originates); BCfnl is the accumulated bother cost to entities resulting from all the
transfers that agent has done up to the current transfer-of-control under consideration.s
If the response is “no”, the leaf node of the path from the initial PTOC node is a SG




P {resp=Silence}eprev × P
{resp=No}
ei
× (EQdei −W (te − ts)−BCsg − SGC) (3.2)
where BCsg is the accumulated bother cost to entities resulting from all the transfers that
the agent has done up to the current transfer-of-control under consideration, and SGC
denotes the cost of generating a new strategy.
3If nobody has been found to answer either “yes” or “no”, we define this as a case of silence.
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In case of a silence response, we put a virtual node dfl (“default”), into the final world.








There are n FTOC nodes, n PTOC nodes, and one virtual node in the overall framework
with n worlds. We obtain the overall EU of strategy s by summing up n EU values for
FTOC nodes, n EU values for SG nodes, and one EU value for the virtual node as follows:
EU(s) = EUn(dfl) +
n∑
j=1
(EUj(fnl) + EUj(sg)) (3.4)
where n represents the number of worlds.
3.2 User Modeling
Projecting the decision making into scenarios of emergency room hospital decision making,
we introduce additional assumptions and proceed to develop user models that comprise the
important features for this environment.
Fleming [11] proposed that a system should ask for further input precisely when the
perceived benefits of this interaction exceed the expected costs. Table 3.1 provides a
summary of the main factors identified in his work, where a domain-independent model
was developed for reasoning about interaction with users. The second column in Table 3.1
classifies each factor as being relevant to the user model (UM), dialogue model (DM) or task
model (TM). Fleming proposed inclusion of all of these factors, but only developed detailed
models of some of these parameters,d as shown in his primary formulae (Section 2.3). In
our work, factors classified as being relevant to the user model will be designed as follows: a
new level of expertise factor, used to help model user knowledge, user unwillingness factor,
and task criticality, all of which are described for our scenarios.
In Section 3.1, we had the PTOC nodes reflecting “Can you take over the decision
making?”. In emergency room scenarios, we now imagine patients arriving, with a current
patient selected as the task that needs to be resolved. We would imagine our algorithms for
decision making being run in order to determine the medical experts to approach, to attend
4The leaf node for the silence response is set to sg.
22
Table 3.1: Summary of factors to be used in model
Factor Model
The user’s knowledge UM
The user’s willingness to interact UM
The user’s preference utility function UM, TM
Task criticality TM, UM
Current context and expected understandability DM, UM
of system utterance
Previous interactions DM
The expected improvement of the system’s TM
task performance due to interaction
Time and time criticality TM
Resource costs and other task-specific costs TM
to the patient. The question behind each new PTOC now becomes: “Can you look after
this patient?”. Following the models of Fleming (Section 2.3) and Cheng (Section 2.6),
decision making will be influenced in part by the cost of bothering a user and in part
based on the expected quality of decision from this user, requiring effective user modeling
to capture these elements.
Below we propose formulae for modeling the cost of bothering users. We assume that
the bother cost of users is determined by their willingness.
3.2.1 User Unwillingness Factor
Fleming proposes the user’s willingness to interact as one of the domain-independent user
modeling factors [11]. In our model, we design a factor called user unwillingness factor
which represents the aspect of the user’s willingness to interact.
Whereas in Fleming’s model [11] each user may have an inherent unwillingness to help,
in our model the user unwillingness factor is determined by adding the values for the
attentional state factor to the lack of expertise factor. In other words, we introduce a
new user modeling parament (expertise) to better model the expected quality of decision
and to ensure that attentional state (whether the medical expert is occupied with another
patient, for the scenario of hospital decision making) critically influences the calculation
of user unwillingness. Table 3.2 shows how the user unwillingness factor is calculated as a
combination of the attentional state factor and the lack of expertise factor.
23
Table 3.2: Calculation of user unwillingness factor
ASF , ASF , ASF ,
Relaxed Neutral Busy
LEF , Low 0.5 0.75 1
LEF , Med 0.75 1 1.25
LEF, High 1 1.25 1.5
The user unwillingness factor of an entity is determined by considering attention state
factor and level of expertise of the entity. For example, the entity is a willing person if
the attention state factor is Relaxed and his knowledge is very helpful for a user. If the
attention state factor is Busy, and she is not good at the specialized area of the current
patient, she would not be willing to help a user. There are three different categories: Med-
Willing, Medium, and Med-Unwilling. Med-Willing is chosen if the attention state
factor is Relaxed and the lack of expertise factor is Low. Also, this state is chosen if the
attention state factor is Neutral and the lack of expertise factor is Low. Med-Unwilling
is chosen if the attention state factor and the lack of expertise factor is Neutral and High,
respectively or Busy and Med.
3.2.2 Level of Expertise
Fleming proposes the user’s knowledge as one of the domain-independent user modeling
factors [11]. Fleming defines the user’s knowledge as how likely it is that the user will have
the required knowledge to answer the question. In our model, we design a factor called
a level of expertise, which includes the same aspect of the user’s knowledge but evaluates
the knowledge to answer “Yes” for the specific question, “Can you take over the decision
making?” in PTOC nodes as described in Section 3.1. If the medical expert as a user
thinks that he/she has enough knowledge to treat the selected patient, the experts will be
willing to answer “Yes” to the question.
In addition, we propose the addition of level of expertise as part of the user mod-
eling for the bother cost, a Lack of Expertise Factor. We choose to model Lack of
Expertise, rather than Expertise in order to make the overall calculations more intu-
itive. A high Lack of Expertise corresponds to a low level of expertise, overall. This
parameter is used to help to record the general level of expertise of each doctor, with
respect to the kind of medical problem that the patient is exhibiting. This is called
Lack of Expertise Factor rather than just Expertise Factor to be consistent in adding
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another factor, User Unwillingness Factor which increases a Cost factor in order to de-
termine bother cost. Therefore, lack of expertise is High when the medical expert is lack
of expertise and Low when the expert is considerable expertise in dealing with the medical
problem of the patient.
Note that modeling lack of expertise enables the overall calculations to fall into the
desired range specified by Cheng (Section 2.6.2). This is explained in greater detail below.
We also adjust the calculations proposed by Cheng for estimating bother cost, (shown
in Section 2.4.2) in order to reduce the number of parameter values that need to be acquired
or solicited (for our time-critical scenarios).
Some factors which affect bother cost in hospital settings are thus as follows.
• The difficulty of the query, TOC Base Bother Cost. In hospital settings with a
streamlined model, this factor is fixed, since we are considering only one question to
ask (whether the user can assist with the patient).
• Attention State Factor reflects how busy the doctor (medical expert) is. A doc-
tor currently without a patient would have a low attentional state value; a doctor
currently attending to a patient would have a high attentional state value.
• The lack of expertise of the doctor, Lack of Expertise Factor (LEF). The expertise
will then affect the unwillingness of the doctor. That is, as this factor increases,
User Unwillingness Factor increases.
• The user’s unwillingness to interact with the system, User Unwillingness Factor.
This is a measure of how receptive (or rather, unreceptive) the doctor is towards being
TOC’ed, and how disrupted they are by interruptions. We currently present a simpli-
fication of this calculation. This factor is obtained by adding Attention State Factor
to Lack of Expertise Factor.
• The timings of the interruptions, t(TOC), and the discount factor, β (0 < β < 1),
which reduces the bother impact of past TOCs as time passes. We choose a relatively
high β because hospital settings are under time-critical situations where the time step
is ‘small’.
With the inclusion of the new parameter, we then propose adjusted formulae for mod-
eling the bother to users with following:
User Unwillingness Factor = Attention State Factor + Lack of Expertise Factor
(3.5)
25
Init = User Unwillingness Factor×Attention State Factor×TOC Base Bother Cost
(3.6)
BSF (Bother So Far) =
∑
toc∈PastTOC
TOC Base Bother Cost(toc)× βt(toc) (3.7)
BC Inc Fn(x, bc inc fac) = xbc inc fac (3.8)
where bc inc fac is determined by user unwillingness factors. If user unwillingness factor
of the user is Willing, bc inc fac is 0.75. If Unwilling, bc inc fac is 1.25. Otherwise,
bc inc fac is 1 as suggested by Cheng [6].
BotherCost(BC) = Init+BC Inc Fn(BSF,User Unwillingness) (3.9)
Here are some suggestions for possible bother cost factor values:
• [TOC Base Bother Cost] Easy=5, Medium=10, Hard=20
• [Attention State Factor] Relaxed=0.75, Neutral=1, Busy=1.25
• [Lack of Expertise Factor] High(i.e., not very expert)=0.25, Medium=0,
Low(i.e., very expert)=−0.25
• [β] 0.90
• [BC Inc Fn] For Willing, BC Inc Fn(x) = x0.75, for Neutral, BC Inc Fn(x) = x1,
for Unwilling, BC Inc Fn(x) = x1.25.
Note that the User Unwillingness Factor ends up producing the value of 2 when the
user is Busy and the Lack of Expertise Factor is High and a value of 0.5 when the user
is Relaxed and the Lack of Expertise Factor is Low. These values in fact correspond to
those suggested for Unwilling and Willing by Cheng (from Section 2.6.2).
3.2.3 Task Criticality
We introduce another new parameter, task criticality (TC), to affect the reasoning about
interaction. TC is used to enable the expected quality of a decision to be weighted more
heavily in the overall calculation of expected utility, when the case at hand is very critical.
This parameter may also be adjusted dynamically. When a patient has high task criticality,
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Table 3.3: Level and increasing rate by the score of task criticality
[0, 10) [10, 80) [80, ∞)
Level of Task Criticality Low Med High
Increasing Rate 2 % 5 % 10 %
Table 3.4: Weights to determine the expected quality of a decision
Task Criticality High Med Low
LEF Low Med High Low Med High Low Med High
Weight 10 % 0 % −10 % 5 % 5 % −5 % 0 % 0 % 0 %
a high level of expertise is required because the patient’s condition may become much more
serious if not treated intensively.
There are two characteristics of task criticality. First, the TC of a patient who is not
treated increases as time passes. We consider different increasing rates for each TC level:
high-level, medium-level, and low-level. In other words, high-level TC will increase faster
than low-level TC as time passes. Generally speaking, more critical patients usually gets
worse quickly than less critical patients. In order to design the dynamic aspect of the
status of the patient, the TC curve should be convex so that the increasing rate would
grow as time passes. However, each patient has his/her own medical problem so that
he/she may have his/her own function of task criticality. We would need to bring the user-
customized task criticality function which could be continuous rather than the discrete our
model suggests. Table 3.3 shows the sample increasing rate for each type of task criticality.
expertise of medical experts.
Second, we propose that the expected quality of a decision is weighted by the TC level
and the level of expertise as presented in Equation (3.10). Table 3.4 shows weights for each




+ (Weight× EQdei) (3.10)
If the TC of some patient is low, the patient does not have to consider the expertise
of a doctor carefully. Thus, the expertise does not affect determining the expected quality
of a decision. However, the TC of some patient is high, the patient should consider the
expertise of a doctor seriously. Therefore, the expertise will affect determining the expected
quality of a decision. In this case, when the TC is high, the expected quality of a decision
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Table 3.5: Probability of entity response to question Q by User Unwillingness Factor
User Unwillingness Factor Y es No Silence
Willing 60 % 20 % 20 %
MedWilling 50 % 30 % 20 %
Neutral 40 % 40 % 20 %
MedUnwilling 30 % 50 % 20 %
Unwilling 20 % 60 % 20 %
needs to be adjusted with more weight. Also, when the TC is low, the expected quality of
a decision needs to be adjusted with less weight.
3.2.4 Probability of Response
In our model, we assume that each user has his/her own probability of response. In
Tambe’s [27] model, we have seen the function of probability of response. Likewise, the
probability of response of users is influenced by the user’s willingness. A willing person
definitely prefers to say, “Yes.” rather than “No”.
Our model suggests parameter values as shown in Table 3.5. We basically give the same
estimate of probability for the case of “Yes” and “No” if the user unwillingness factor of
the entity is Neutral. For Willing and Med-Willing entities, we increase the probability
for the case of “yes” and decrease the probability for the case of “No”. On the other
hand, for Unwilling and Med-Unwilling entities, we increase the probability for the case
of “No” and decrease the probability for the case of “Yes”. This simplification is revisited
in Section 6.1.2.
As Cheng [6] has a discretized time step function with probability of responses values,
different probabilities of responses are given in Table 3.6 5 which represents the suggested
probability of responses for “Yes” and “No”. We assume that a willingness person prefer
to give a response quickly.
In our strategy chain, we move to the next world if the response from the entity who
was asked is silence. We need to check how much time has been passed so that we can
find whether the response from the entity can be considered as silence. When you see the
Table 3.6, the willingness entity is 33% during the 1st time unit, 27% during the 2nd time
5Suggested values in Table 3.6 are initially defined to execute but could be updated by keeping track
of behavior of entities.
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Table 3.6: Probability of how quickly entity responds to question
User Unwillingness Factor 1 unit 2 unit 3 unit 4 unit
Willing 33 % 27 % 13 % 7 %
MedWilling 27 % 23 % 17 % 13 %
Neutral 20 % 20 % 20 % 20 %
MedUnwilling 13 % 17 % 23 % 27 %
Unwilling 7 % 13 % 27 % 33 %
unit, 13% during the 3rd time unit, and 7% during the 4th time unit. The sum of all the
probabilities becomes 80% which implies that the entity has 80 percent for the response
between “Yes” and “No”.
For example, the user unwillingness factor of the entity who is asked is Willing, the
entity would willing to respond shortly. However, if the user unwillingness factor of the




In this chapter, we present a series of examples to demonstrate the value of our proposed
framework. In particular, we anticipate having our algorithm running, determining the
best strategy (which experts to ask, how long to wait) which would then inform the first
clinical assistant (FCA) of how to address the needs of the current patient. Below is an
overview of the examples we introduce and the parts of our model that they illustrate:
Section 4.1 Fixed initial parameters for entities and patient - strategy chain is shown
Scenario 1 high critical patient
Scenario 2 medium critical patient
Scenario 3 low critical patient
Section 4.2 Variable initial parameters for entities - strategy chain is shown
Scenario 1 high critical patient - best expert is Relaxed
Scenario 2 high critical patient - best expert is Busy
Scenario 3 low critical patient - best experts are all Busy
Section 4.3 executing a strategy - varying responses from entities
Scenario 1 of Section 4.2
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4.1 Different Task Criticality Values
This first set of examples briefly illustrates how different strategies are selected to execute,
when the criticality of the patient is different. We assume 4 medical experts and keep
their parameter values the same for all three scenarios in this subsection. We vary the
task criticality of the current patient: high in scenario 1, medium in scenario 2 and low in
scenario 3.
We illustrate how effective choices are made to enable the coordination of medical
professionals and the resolution of the decision making regarding patient care in hospital
emergency room scenarios.
In our example, the 4 possible medical experts to approach, each has differing expected
quality of decision making, differing attentional state (e.g. attending to other patients
currently or not), and different inherent willingness to assist.
The model parameters used in our scenarios are as follows:
• [TOC Base Bother Cost] 15
• [Time discount factor β] 0.90
• [initial EQ] 150
• [Cost of Waiting, W (t)] t1.5
• [the Number of Worlds (n)] 4
• [SGC] 0 cost
Note that we assume that the cost of regenerating a strategy is simply zero. We also
assume that the expected quality of decision for all specialists begins with the same initial
base value (which is then adjusted according to the user’s expertise level as discussed
earlier). The TOC Base Bother Cost is set “somewhat high” (using the range of values
listed in Section 2.6.2 and 3.2.2). This is because our one question has the purpose of
getting a user to agree to carry out a decision.
As shown in Table 3.3, there are levels of task criticality and increasing rates for each
level of task criticality. We assume that the patient’s criticality will be assessed by the
first clinical assistant attending to the patient (and it may be periodically updated, as the
patient continues to be unattended).
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Table 4.1: Probability of entity response to question Q by Attentional State Factor
Attentional State Factor Y es No Silence
Relaxed 0.45 0.45 0.1
Busy 0.1 0.6 0.3
Table 4.2: Elapsed time (in time units)
Attentional State Factor Lack-of -expertise Factor Y es No Silence
Relaxed Low 2 4 5
Relaxed High 3 3 5
Busy Low 3 3 5
Busy High 4 2 5
The probability of response depends on the user unwillingness factor of each doctor. Ta-
ble 4.1 represents a probability of response for “Yes”, “No”, and “Silence”, which includes
two cases: relaxed and busy with respect to the attentional state factor.
The time by which a response to a question will be generated from the doctors will be
referred to as the elapsed time. We have this elapsed time determined by the attentional
state factor and the expertise level of the doctor, according to predefined values as provided
in Table 4.2. The units of time are left unspecified. Note that we assume a fixed elapsed
time for all the cases of “silence”.
In our scenario, we divide task criticality into three levels: high, medium, and low
level. Given the level of task criticality, we determine the expected quality of a decision by
adding a weight represented in Table 3.4. The expected quality of a decision is dynamically
changed by the change of the value of task criticality as time progresses.
Table 4.3 shows profiles of available doctors in a hospital currently (experts e1, e2, e3,
and e4), for our sample scenarios below.
Scenario 1.
A patient has just arrived at the emergency room who is assessed as highly critical. The
FCA tries to search for the right doctor for the current patient with the decision-support
system. In this hospital, as in Table 4.3, there are four doctors, e1, e2, e3, and e4. Our sys-
tem checks the profile of each doctor and begins finding the optimal strategy by calculating
an expected utility for each generated strategy. Since there are four doctors, we obtain
4! strategies. By evaluating each strategy, we obtain 24 expected utility values for each
strategy shown in Table 4.4. This is computed using Equation 3.4, which in turn relies on
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Table 4.3: Profiles of entities at the time the patient arrives
e1 e2 e3 e4
Attentional State Factor Relaxed Busy Busy Relaxed
Lack-of-expertise Factor Low High Low High
Probability of Response for Yes 0.45 0.1 0.1 0.45
Probability of Response for No 0.45 0.6 0.6 0.45
Probability of Response for Silence 0.1 0.3 0.3 0.1
Elapsed time for Yes 2 4 3 3
Elapsed time for No 4 2 3 3
Elapsed time for Silence 5 5 5 5
calculation of bother cost, sensitive to each particular expert who might be asked. The
greatest expected utility is EU(s) = 198.39, the strategy chain: e1 - e3 - e4 - e2.
The strategies that ask e4 first do not have high EU values, even though the expert is
not Busy and can attend to the patient. This is because the High Criticality of the patient
has raised the weight of the EQ value in the calculation. The maximal EU of a strategy
that asks e4 first is 49.87. Likewise, strategies that select e2 first have very low EU values,
as this expert is both Busy and has High Lack of Expertise.
Scenario 2.
A patient has just arrived at the emergency room, assessed at medium criticality. The FCA
tries to search for the right doctor for the current patient with the decision-support system.
In this hospital, there are again four doctors, e1, e2, e3, and e4. Our system checks the profile
of each doctor and begins finding the optimal strategy by calculating an expected utility
for each generated strategy. As before, since there are four doctors, we obtain 4! strategies.
By evaluating each strategy, we obtain 24 expected utility values for each strategy shown
in Table 4.5. The greatest expected utility is EU(s) = 163.03 whose strategy chain is e1 -
e3 - e4 - e2.
Scenario 3.
A patient has just arrived at the emergency room, assessed at low criticality (but still in
need of specialized assistance). The FCA tries to search for the right doctor for the current
patient with the decision-support system. In this hospital, there are four doctors, e1, e2, e3,
and e4. Our system checks the profile of each doctor and begins determining the optimal
strategy by calculating an expected utility for each generated strategy. And since there
are four doctors, we obtain 4! strategies once more. By evaluating each strategy, we obtain
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Table 4.4: Expected utility of strategies at the time the patient arrives
No. Expected Utility (EU) Strategy Chain
1 189.055932 e1 - e2 - e3 - e4
2 186.222260 e1 - e2 - e4 - e3
3 197.846134 e1 - e3 - e2 - e4
4 198.391167 e1 - e3 - e4 - e2
5 189.251631 e1 - e4 - e3 - e2
6 188.493741 e1 - e4 - e2 - e3
7 49.190011 e2 - e1 - e3 - e4
8 46.356339 e2 - e1 - e4 - e3
9 44.739695 e2 - e3 - e1 - e4
10 32.315057 e2 - e3 - e4 - e1
11 4.896448 e2 - e4 - e3 - e1
12 5.150315 e2 - e4 - e1 - e3
13 138.701167 e3 - e2 - e1 - e4
14 126.276528 e3 - e2 - e4 - e1
15 177.340219 e3 - e1 - e2 - e4
16 177.885253 e3 - e1 - e4 - e2
17 136.679229 e3 - e4 - e1 - e2
18 133.046656 e3 - e4 - e2 - e1
19 35.955365 e4 - e2 - e3 - e1
20 36.209232 e4 - e2 - e1 - e3
21 44.745566 e4 - e3 - e2 - e1
22 48.378139 e4 - e3 - e1 - e2
23 49.867505 e4 - e1 - e3 - e2
24 49.109615 e4 - e1 - e2 - e3
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Table 4.5: Expected utility of strategies at the time the patient arrives
No. Expected Utility (EU) Strategy Chain
1 157.143432 e1 - e2 - e3 - e4
2 156.109760 e1 - e2 - e4 - e3
3 162.258634 e1 - e3 - e2 - e4
4 163.028667 e1 - e3 - e4 - e2
5 158.614131 e1 - e4 - e3 - e2
6 158.381241 e1 - e4 - e2 - e3
7 64.527511 e2 - e1 - e3 - e4
8 63.493839 e2 - e1 - e4 - e3
9 60.077195 e2 - e3 - e1 - e4
10 53.727557 e2 - e3 - e4 - e1
11 40.483948 e2 - e4 - e3 - e1
12 40.512815 e2 - e4 - e1 - e3
13 117.288667 e3 - e2 - e1 - e4
14 110.939028 e3 - e2 - e4 - e1
15 141.752719 e3 - e1 - e2 - e4
16 142.522753 e3 - e1 - e4 - e2
17 119.541729 e3 - e4 - e1 - e2
18 117.709156 e3 - e4 - e2 - e1
19 71.542865 e4 - e2 - e3 - e1
20 71.571732 e4 - e2 - e1 - e3
21 76.658066 e4 - e3 - e2 - e1
22 78.490639 e4 - e3 - e1 - e2
23 79.980005 e4 - e1 - e3 - e2
24 79.747115 e4 - e1 - e2 - e3
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24 expected utility values for each strategy as shown in Table 4.6. The greatest expected
utility is EU(s) = 128.20 whose strategy chain is e1 - e4 - e3 - e2.
4.2 Conflicting Parameter Values
This series of examples serves to show which strategies are selected when there is a tension
between certain parameter values. The first scenario is a base case, where the expert chosen
to be first in the strategy is the one who will deliver the best expected quality of decision
and is also enduring the least bother. The second scenario is of a highly critical patient,
where there is a tension between choosing the best expert for this important task against
the cost of bother, since this expert is currently at a high bother level as well. The last
scenario is one of a patient with low criticality, where again there is a best expert who is at
a high state of bother, but where perhaps an expert with low bother and lower expertise
will be adequate to approach.
The examples in this subsection are also described at a greater level of detail. This
is done in order to further clarify all the steps that are proposed in our framework in
determining the appropriate strategy chain, along with various processes to update and
manage the parameters that serve to model the environment.
4.2.1 Scenario 1
In this example, there are five patients waiting for treatment and four medical experts in
the emergency room. The FCA tries to search for the right doctor for the current patient.






Entity Specialized Area Number of Patients LEF
e1 Cardio 7 Med
e2 Cardio 100 Low
e3 Cardio 0 High
e4 Cardio 0 High
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Table 4.6: Expected utility of strategies at the time the patient arrives
No. Expected Utility (EU) Strategy Chain
1 125.905932 e1 - e2 - e3 - e4
2 125.772260 e1 - e2 - e4 - e3
3 127.346134 e1 - e3 - e2 - e4
4 127.891167 e1 - e3 - e4 - e2
5 128.201631 e1 - e4 - e3 - e2
6 128.043741 e1 - e4 - e2 - e3
7 80.540011 e2 - e1 - e3 - e4
8 80.406339 e2 - e1 - e4 - e3
9 76.089695 e2 - e3 - e1 - e4
10 74.465057 e2 - e3 - e4 - e1
11 75.396448 e2 - e4 - e3 - e1
12 75.650315 e2 - e4 - e1 - e3
13 96.551167 e3 - e2 - e1 - e4
14 94.926528 e3 - e2 - e4 - e1
15 106.840219 e3 - e1 - e2 - e4
16 107.385253 e3 - e1 - e4 - e2
17 102.629229 e3 - e4 - e1 - e2
18 101.696656 e3 - e4 - e2 - e1
19 106.455365 e4 - e2 - e3 - e1
20 106.709232 e4 - e2 - e1 - e3
21 107.895566 e4 - e3 - e2 - e1
22 108.828139 e4 - e3 - e1 - e2
23 110.317505 e4 - e1 - e3 - e2
24 110.159615 e4 - e1 - e2 - e3
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Entity Specialized Area Number of Patients LEF
e1 Neuro 0 High
e2 Neuro 0 High
e3 Neuro 15 Med
e4 Neuro 120 Low
1. The FCA identifies the most serious patient from the waiting list. Below is a waiting
list in this scenario. Our system chooses p2 since the task criticality of p2 is high-
est among patients. Since p2’s task criticality is greater than 80 according to the
Table 3.3, he is assessed as highly critical.
No. Patient Medical Problem Task Criticality
1 p1 Cardio 70
2 p2 Cardio 90
3 p3 Neuro 63
4 p4 Cardio 82
5 p5 Neuro 70
2. Then, the waiting list is updated by eliminating the selected patient which has been
assessed as the most critical patient. Thus, the number of patients remains becomes
four. Below is a table where you can find a updated waiting list in our scenario.
No. Patient Medical Problem Task Criticality
1 p1 Cardio 70
2 p3 Neuro 63
3 p4 Cardio 82
4 p5 Neuro 70
3. We generated strategies by following the process introduced in Chapter 3. In our
scenario, 4! strategies are generated since there are four entities attending in our
scenario.
4. We evaluate the expected utility of each strategy generated in step 3. There are
several steps to evaluate the expected utility as follows:
(a) We set values of parameters for each entity based on the profile of the current
patient. We already know some information about each entity such as atten-
tional state factor, specialized area, and the number of patients the entity has
treated. We would like to set the following parameters: lack of expertise factor,
probability of response for answer, and probability of response, and how quickly
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the entity will respond, bc inc fac, and Init. These parameter values are used
to determine the bother cost of each entity.
The current patient we picked at step 1 has a medical what classified as Cardio.
The specialized area of e1 is Cardio, which is what the current patient requires,
but e1 has treated only 7 patients which have the same medical problem. Thus,
we consider this entity as Med person for the level of expertise factor. In case
of e2, his specialized area is the same as the problem the current patient has
and the number of patients is 100, which represents his expertise for the medical
problem. Therefore, the level of expertise factor becomes Low (lack of exper-
tise). However, e3 and e4 are assessed as entities whose lack of expertise factor
is High because they do not have any specialized area for the specific medical
problem the current patient has.
Now we can obtain the user unwillingness value by adding the value of atten-
tional state factor to the value of lack of expertise factor as we specified in
formula 3.5. With the user unwillingness factor, we define a value of probability
of response for each case of “Yes,” “No,” and “Silence” according to the table
below.
Entity ASF LEF UUF Yes No Silence
e1 Relaxed Med Med-Willing 50% 30% 20%
e2 Relaxed Low Willing 60% 20% 20%
e3 Busy High Unwilling 20% 60% 20%
e4 Relaxed High Medium 40% 40% 20%
We can also determine the probability of response of each entity based on his/her
user unwillingness factor as shown in Table 3.5.
Entity ASF LEF UUF 1 unit 2 unit 3 unit 4 unit
e1 Relaxed Med Med-Willing 27% 23% 17% 13%
e2 Relaxed Low Willing 33% 27% 13% 7%
e3 Busy High Unwilling 7% 13% 27% 33%
e4 Relaxed High Medium 20% 20% 20% 20%
We finally obtain the value of bc inc fac, the exponent used for the bother in-
creasing function based on the willingness values as below and calculate another
variable Init by following the formulae introduced in Section 3.2.2.
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Entity UUF bc inc fac Init
e1 Med-Willing 1 8.4375
e2 Willing 0.75 5.625
e3 Unwilling 1.25 28.125
e4 Medium 1 11.25
where the calculations are:
• Init(e1) = User Unwillingness Factor × Attention State Factor
× TOC BaseBotherCost = 0.75× 0.75× 15 = 8.4375
• Init(e2) = 0.5× 0.75× 15 = 5.625
• Init(e3) = 1.5× 1.25× 15 = 28.125
• Init(e4) = 1× 0.75× 15 = 11.25
(b) We update the task criticality(TC) of the current patient with different TC
weights as time passes. TC increases by 10% if it is highly critical as shown in
Table 3.3. The TC of the current patient is initially 90. If the strategy chain is
e3 - e2 - e1 - e4, e3 will meet the patient whose task criticality is 90. However,
e2 will meet the patient whose task criticality is 99, which is increased by 10%.
The task criticality goes up to 108.9 and 119.79 for e1 and e4.
(c) The EQ values are also set with different EQ weights as time passes. According
to Table 3.4, the EQ value of e1 is weighted by zero so that the EQ value is the
same as the initial value. However, the EQ value of e2 becomes 165 because e2
has expertise. On the other hand, the EQ values of e3 and e4 become 135 which
is less than the initial value, 150, because they do not have any expertise for
the medical problem of the patient. That is, e3 and e4 cannot treat the highly
critical patient very well due to the lack of expertise for the specific medical
problem of the patient.
e1 e2 e3 e4
EQ 150 165 135 135
(d) We calculate the expected utility for each FTOC node for “Yes”, SG node for
“No”, and Default node for “Silence” as we described in Section 3.1.3.
(e) After aggregating the expected utility value for each node as in formula 3.4 we
evaluate the final expected utility value of the current strategy chain.
(f) We repeat step 3 and 4 in order to evaluate the expected utility value for each
strategy chain and choose to execute the strategy with the highest expected
utility. (Note that we would repeat from step 1 to 4 until there is no patient on
the waiting list, in order to process all the patients.)
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5. We ask the first entity in the strategy we have chosen to execute the query, “Can
you take on this patient?”. The entities are ordered on the optimal strategy chain
which has been obtained at the step of strategy generation and evaluation.
(a) First, we set values for parameters of each entity based on the profile of the
current patient. There are parameters such as attentional state factor and the
number of patients the medical expert treated so far for the specific medical
problem.
We would like to change the parameter of each entity based on the type of
responses such as Yes, No, or Silence after asking him/her a question, “Can you
come over and take the patient right now?”.
i. If the response from the entity is “Yes,” we assign the entity to the patient.
At this time, the attentional state of the entity is changed to BUSY . Then,
we go to step 1 in order to treat the next patient1.
ii. If the response from the entity is “No,” we simply go to step 3 in order to
regenerate the strategy chain.
iii. If there is no response from the entity and the entity was not the person
positioned as a last one on the strategy chain, we simply ask the next entity
and repeat step 5(a) through step 5(c). If the response from the entity is
silence and the entity was the last person who was asked on the strategy
chain, we go to step 3 in order to regenerate the strategy chain.
Table 4.7 shows the list of expected utility of strategies at the time the patient arrives
in Scenario 1. It shows that the optimal strategy chain is e2 - e1 - e4 - e3 whose expected
utility is 130.080393.
Note that as housekeeping, we update task criticality (TC) of the patients as time
passes. As explained, we increase the TC of the current patient who is looking for a
medical expert. Second, we increase the TC of the patients on the waiting list. Finally,
we decrease the TC of the patients who are currently being treated by medical experts2.
The task criticality of patients on the waiting list are increased by the increasing rate
corresponding to the TC of each patient.
1If the entity answering “Yes” is the last person on the strategy chain, we end up the process for finding
the best entity.
2We assume that patients medical experts are treating get better, even though it might get worse in
real-life situations.
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Table 4.7: Expected utility of strategies at the time the patient arrives
No. Expected Utility (EU) Strategy Chain
1 113.707732 e1 - e2 - e3 - e4
2 114.581042 e1 - e2 - e4 - e3
3 103.964326 e1 - e3 - e2 - e4
4 102.780795 e1 - e3 - e4 - e2
5 106.715640 e1 - e4 - e3 - e2
6 108.785957 e1 - e4 - e2 - e3
7 129.207084 e2 - e1 - e3 - e4
8 130.080393 e2 - e1 - e4 - e3
9 123.195320 e2 - e3 - e1 - e4
10 122.913160 e2 - e3 - e4 - e1
11 126.859259 e2 - e4 - e3 - e1
12 128.025983 e2 - e4 - e1 - e3
13 75.616428 e3 - e2 - e1 - e4
14 75.334268 e3 - e2 - e4 - e1
15 71.884786 e3 - e1 - e2 - e4
16 70.701255 e3 - e1 - e4 - e2
17 68.646845 e3 - e4 - e1 - e2
18 69.552732 e3 - e4 - e2 - e1
19 99.140234 e4 - e2 - e3 - e1
20 100.306958 e4 - e2 - e1 - e3
21 89.412599 e4 - e3 - e2 - e1
22 88.506712 e4 - e3 - e1 - e2
23 94.495967 e4 - e1 - e3 - e2
24 96.566284 e4 - e1 - e2 - e3
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4.2.2 Scenario 2
In our example, there are currently five patients who are waiting for treatment and these
are four medical experts in the emergency room. The FCA tries to search for the right
doctor for the current patient as we have seen in Scenario 1. Below are profiles of medical
experts. The status of each entity is the same as in Scenario 1 except the attentional state






Entity Specialized Area Number of Patients LEF
e1 Cardio 7 Med
e2 Cardio 100 Low
e3 Cardio 0 High
e4 Cardio 0 High
Entity Specialized Area Number of Patients LEF
e1 Neuro 0 High
e2 Neuro 0 High
e3 Neuro 15 Med
e4 Neuro 120 Low
1. The FCA chooses the most serious patient from the waiting list as described in
Scenario 1. Below is a table where you can find a waiting list in our scenario. Our
system chooses p2 since the task criticality of p2 is highest among patients. Since p2’s
task criticality is greater than 80 according to the table 3.3, he is assessed as highly
critical.
No. Patient Medical Problem Task Criticality
1 p1 Cardio 70
2 p2 Cardio 90
3 p3 Neuro 63
4 p4 Cardio 82
5 p5 Neuro 70
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2. Then, the waiting list is updated by eliminating the selected patient which has been
assessed as the most critical patient. Thus, the number of patients remaining be-
comes four. Below is a table where you can find a updated waiting list in our scenario.
No. Patient Medical Problem Task Criticality
1 p1 Cardio 70
2 p3 Cardio 63
3 p4 Cardio 82
4 p5 Neuro 70
3. We generated strategies by following the process introduced in Chapter 3. In our
scenario, 4! strategies are generated since there are four entities attending in our
scenario.
4. We evaluate the expected utility of each strategy generated in step 3. There are
several steps to evaluate the expected utility with following:
(a) We set values for parameters of each entity based on the profile of the current
patient. We already know some information about each entity, such as atten-
tional state factor, specialized area, and the number of patients the entity has
treated. We would like to set the following parameters: lack of expertise factor,
probability of response for answer, and probability of response how quickly the
entity will response, bc inc fac, and Init. These parameter values are used to
determine the bother cost of each entity.
Now we can obtain user unwillingness factor by adding attentional state factor
to lack of expertise factor and have a slightly new table, as below. With user
unwillingness factor, we set a value of probability of response for each cases such
as “Yes,” “No,” and “Silence” according to the Table 4.1.
Entity ASF LEF UUF Yes No Silence
e1 Relaxed Med Med-Willing 50% 30% 20%
e2 Busy Low Medium 40% 40% 20%
e3 Busy High Unwilling 20% 60% 20%
e4 Relaxed High Medium 40% 40% 20%
We can also find the probability of response, which represents how quickly the
entity will respond.
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Entity ASF LEF UUF 1 unit 2 unit 3 unit 4 unit
e1 Relaxed Med Med-Willing 27% 23% 17% 13%
e2 Busy Low Medium 20% 20% 20% 20%
e3 Busy High Unwilling 7% 13% 27% 33%
e4 Relaxed High Medium 20% 20% 20% 20%
The values of bc inc fac and Init are as below:
Entity UUF bc inc fac Init
e1 Med-Willing 1 8.4375
e2 Medium 1 18.75
e3 Unwilling 1.25 28.125
e4 Medium 1 11.25
where the calculations are:
• Init(e1) = User Unwillingness Factor × Attention State Factor
× TOC BaseBotherCost = 0.75× 0.75× 15 = 8.4375
• Init(e2) = 1× 1.25× 15 = 18.75
• Init(e3) = 1.5× 1.25× 15 = 28.125
• Init(e4) = 1× 0.75× 15 = 11.25
(b) We update the task criticality(TC) of the current patient with different TC
weights as time passes. TC increases by 10% if it is highly critical as shown in
Table 3.3. TC of the current patient is initially 90. If the strategy chain is e3 -
e2 - e1 - e4, e3 will meet the patient whose task criticality is 90. However, e2 will
meet the patient whose task criticality is 99, which is increased by 10%. The
task criticality goes up into 108.9 and 119.79.
(c) The EQ values are also set with different EQ weights as time passes. According
to Table 3.4, the EQ value of e1 is weighted by zero so that the EQ value is
same as the initial value. However, the EQ value of e2 becomes 165 because e2
has expertise. On the other hand, the EQ values of e3 and e4 become 135 which
is less than the initial value, 150 because they do not have any expertise for
the medical problem of the patient. That is, e3 and e4 cannot treat the highly
critical patient very well due to the lack of expertise for the specific medical
problem of the patient.
e1 e2 e3 e4
EQ 150 165 135 135
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(d) We calculate the expected utility for each FTOC node for “Yes”, SG node for
“No”, and Default node for “Silence” as we described in Section 3.1.3.
(e) After aggregating the expected utility value for each node, we evaluate the final
expected utility value of the current strategy chain.
(f) We repeat step 3 and 4 in order to evaluate the expected utility value for each
strategy chain.
(g) We repeat from step 1 to 4 until there is no patient on the waiting list
5. We ask the entity with a query. The entities are ordered on the optimal strategy
chain which has been obtained at the step of strategy generation and evaluation.
Table 4.8 shows the list of expected utility of strategy chain at the time the patient
arrives in Scenario 2. We find that the optimal strategy chain is e1 - e2 - e4 - e3 whose
expected utility is 110.031364.
4.2.3 Scenario 3
In this example, there are currently five patients waiting for treatment and four medical
experts in the emergency room. The FCA tries to search for the right doctor for the current






Entity Specialized Area Number of Patients LEF
e1 Cardio 7 Med
e2 Cardio 100 Low
e3 Cardio 2 High
e4 Cardio 2 High
Entity Specialized Area Number of Patients LEF
e1 Neuro 2 High
e2 Neuro 2 High
e3 Neuro 15 Med
e4 Neuro 120 Low
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Table 4.8: Expected utility of strategies at the time the patient arrives
No. Expected Utility (EU) Strategy Chain
1 109.158054 e1 - e2 - e3 - e4
2 110.031364 e1 - e2 - e4 - e3
3 103.040701 e1 - e3 - e2 - e4
4 102.608701 e1 - e3 - e4 - e2
5 106.566054 e1 - e4 - e3 - e2
6 107.871364 e1 - e4 - e2 - e3
7 107.738381 e2 - e1 - e3 - e4
8 108.611691 e2 - e1 - e4 - e3
9 101.726617 e2 - e3 - e1 - e4
10 101.444457 e2 - e3 - e4 - e1
11 105.390556 e2 - e4 - e3 - e1
12 106.557280 e2 - e4 - e1 - e3
13 71.066750 e3 - e2 - e1 - e4
14 70.784590 e3 - e2 - e4 - e1
15 70.961161 e3 - e1 - e2 - e4
16 70.529161 e3 - e1 - e4 - e2
17 68.474750 e3 - e4 - e1 - e2
18 68.624590 e3 - e4 - e2 - e1
19 94.590556 e4 - e2 - e3 - e1
20 95.757280 e4 - e2 - e1 - e3
21 88.484457 e4 - e3 - e2 - e1
22 88.334617 e4 - e3 - e1 - e2
23 94.346381 e4 - e1 - e3 - e2
24 95.651691 e4 - e1 - e2 - e3
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1. The FCA identifies the most serious patient from the waiting list. Below is a waiting
list in this scenario. Our system chooses p2 since the task criticality of p2 is highest
among patients. Since p2’s task criticality is less than 10 according to the table 3.3,
he is assessed as low critical, while the most critical patient was assessed as high
critical in Scenario 1 and 2.
No. Patient Medical Problem Task Criticality
1 p1 Cardio 7
2 p2 Cardio 9
3 p3 Neuro 6
4 p4 Cardio 8
5 p5 Neuro 7
2. Then, the waiting list is updated by eliminating the selected patient which has been
assessed as the most critical patient. Thus, the number of patients remained becomes
four. Below is a table where you can find a updated waiting list in our scenario.
No. Patient Medical Problem Task Criticality
1 p1 Cardio 7
2 p3 Neuro 6
3 p4 Cardios 8
4 p5 Neuro 7
3. We generated strategies by following the process introduced in Chapter 3. In our
scenario, 4! strategies are generated since there are four entities attending in our
scenario.
4. We evaluate the expected utility of each strategy generated in step 3. There are
several steps to evaluate the expected utility as follows:
(a) We set values for parameters of each entity based on the profile of the current
patient. We already know some information about each entity, such as atten-
tional state factor, specialized area, and the number of patients the entity has
treated. We would like to set the following parameters: lack of expertise factor,
probability of response for answer, and probability of response for how quickly
the entity will response, bc inc fac, and Init. These parameter values are used
to determine the bother cost of each entity.
Now we can obtain user unwillingness factor by adding attentional state factor to
lack of expertise factor as we described in Section 3.2.2. With user unwillingness
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factor, we set values of probability of response for each case such as “Yes,” “No,”
and “Silence” according to the Table 4.1.
Entity ASF LEF UUF Yes No Silence
e1 Busy Med Med-Unwilling 30% 50% 20%
e2 Busy Low Medium 40% 40% 20%
e3 Busy High Unwilling 20% 60% 20%
e4 Relaxed High Medium 40% 40% 20%
We can also find the probability of response, which represents how quickly the
entity will response.
Entity ASF LEF UUF 1 unit 2 unit 3 unit 4 unit
e1 Busy Med Med-Unwilling 13% 17% 23% 27%
e2 Busy Low Medium 20% 20% 20% 20%
e3 Busy High Unwilling 7% 13% 27% 33%
e4 Relaxed High Medium 20% 20% 20% 20%
The values of bc inc fac and Init are as below.
Entity UUF bc inc fac Init
e1 Med-Unwilling 1 8.4375
e2 Medium 1 18.75
e3 Unwilling 1.25 28.125
e4 Medium 1 11.25
where the calculations are:
• Init(e1) = User Unwillingness Factor × Attention State Factor
× TOC BaseBotherCost = 1.25× 1.25× 15 = 23.4375
• Init(e2) = 1× 1.25× 15 = 18.75
• Init(e3) = 1.5× 1.25× 15 = 28.125
• Init(e4) = 1× 0.75× 15 = 11.25
(b) We update the task criticality (TC) of the current patient with different TC
weights as time passes. TC increases by 2% if it is highly critical as shown in
Table 3.3. TC of the current patient is initially 9. If the strategy chain is e2 - e3
- e4 - e1, e2 will meet the patient whose task criticality is 90. However, e3 will
meet the patient whose task criticality is 9.18, which is increased by 2%. The
task criticality goes up into 9.3636 and 9.5509.
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(c) The EQ values are also set with different EQ weights as time passes. According
to the table 3.4, however, the EQ value of any entities is not weighed because
the task criticality of the patient is low. That is, the EQ value of e1, e2, e3, and
e4 is 150 which is the initial value. Therefore, every entity has equally likely
ability to treat the patient.
e1 e2 e3 e4
EQ 150 150 150 150
(d) We calculate the expected utility for each FTOC node for “Yes”, SG node for
“No”, and Default node for Silence as we described in Section 3.1.3.
(e) After aggregating the expected utility value for each node, we evaluate the final
expected utility value of the current strategy chain.
(f) We repeat step 3 and 4 in order to evaluate the expected utility value for each
strategy chain.
(g) We repeat from step 1 to 4 until there is no patient on the waiting list
5. We ask the entity with a query. The entities are ordered on the optimal strategy
chain which has been obtained at the step of strategy generation and evaluation.
Table 4.9 displays the list of expected utility of strategy chain at the time the patient
arrives in Scenario 3. We find that the optimal strategy chain is e4 - e1 - e2 - e3 whose
expected utility is 105.848998.
4.3 Executing a Strategy
This example revisits Scenarios 1 in Section 4.2, in order to illustrate the possible out-
comes in executing a particular strategy. In particular, we examine a few distinct cases,
showing different possible responses from the experts to whom decision making control is
transferred, within the overall strategy.
Case 1. The first clinical assistant(FCA) obtained the optimal strategy chain and
asked the first expert in strategy a query, “Can you help with the current patient?”. The
expert provided a “Yes” response to the FCA in 3 unit time and the FCA assigned the
patient to the expert. The expert that was relaxed became busy after taking the patient.
Case 2. The FCA obtained the optimal strategy chain and asked the first expert in
strategy a query, “Can you help with the current patient?”. The expert did not provide
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Table 4.9: Expected utility of strategies at the time the patient arrives
No. Expected Utility (EU) Strategy Chain
1 92.028054 e1 - e2 - e3 - e4
2 92.901364 e1 - e2 - e4 - e3
3 90.230701 e1 - e3 - e2 - e4
4 90.182701 e1 - e3 - e4 - e2
5 94.140054 e1 - e4 - e3 - e2
6 95.061364 e1 - e4 - e2 - e3
7 94.415688 e2 - e1 - e3 - e4
8 95.288998 e2 - e1 - e4 - e3
9 92.469555 e2 - e3 - e1 - e4
10 92.230492 e2 - e3 - e4 - e1
11 96.199099 e2 - e4 - e3 - e1
12 97.300218 e2 - e4 - e1 - e3
13 81.009687 e3 - e2 - e1 - e4
14 80.770625 e3 - e2 - e4 - e1
15 81.158468 e3 - e1 - e2 - e4
16 81.110468 e3 - e1 - e4 - e2
17 83.121687 e3 - e4 - e1 - e2
18 82.930625 e3 - e4 - e2 - e1
19 104.599099 e4 - e2 - e3 - e1
20 105.700218 e4 - e2 - e1 - e3
21 102.790492 e4 - e3 - e2 - e1
22 102.981555 e4 - e3 - e1 - e2
23 104.927688 e4 - e1 - e3 - e2
24 105.848998 e4 - e1 - e2 - e3
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any response even after 5 unit time had passed. Our system classified him as Silence and
suggested the FCA to ask the second best expert. The expert provided a “Yes” response
to the FCA in 2 unit time and the FCA assigned the patient to the expert.
Case 3. The FCA obtained the optimal strategy chain and asked the first expert in
strategy a query, “Can you help with the current patient?”. The expert did not provide
any response even after 5 unit time had passed. Thus, the FCA tried to ask the second
best expert but he also did not give any response for 5 unit time. The FCA asked the
third expert in the strategy. She said “Yes” immediately The patient is finally assigned to
the third expert. This might happen, for instance, if the first two experts, thought to be
Relaxed, actually became Busy and the third expert, thought to be Busy, became free by
the time she was asked.
Case 4. The FCA obtained the optimal strategy chain and asked the first expert in
strategy a query, “Can you help with the current patient?”. The expert did not provide
any response even after 5 unit time had passed. Thus, the FCA tried to ask the second
best expert but he also did not give any response for 5 unit time. The FCA asked the third
and fourth experts in the strategy but they also provided only Silence. Meanwhile, time
has been passed and the expert who had the greatest quality of decision was no longer
busy because the patient left the expert as she got better due to the treatment by that
expert. Strategy regeneration would put this expert as the first entity to whom control





Our validation measures performance of our model reflecting dynamic and time critical
aspects. Our simulation used Matlab (R2010a) on a machine with the following settings:
AMD athlon(tm) 64 X2 Dual, Core Processor 5600+, 2.91 GHz, and 3.25 GB of RAM. In
the setting of our validation simulating hospital emergency scenarios, there are four entities
on the entity list and five patients on the waiting list. Below are profiles of patients and
entities.
No. Patient Medical Problem Task Criticality
1 p1 Cardio 70
2 p2 Cardio 90
3 p3 Neuro 63
4 p4 Cardio 82
5 p5 Neuro 70
Entity ASF Specialized Area Number of Patients
e1 Relaxed Cardio 7
e2 Relaxed Cardio 100
e3 Relaxed Neuro 15
e4 Relaxed Neuro 120
*e5 Relaxed Neuro 240
*e6 Relaxed Cardio 98
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Note that entities e5 and e6 on the entity profiles were not included during the simulation
with 4 entities case.
Every patient has a task criticality for his/her specific medical problem, and the task
criticality of each patient is changed dynamically as time progresses.
Our simulation considers all the patients in the emergency room, beginning with the
most critical patient first and then sequentially processing the remaining patients on the
waiting list, always processing the most critical patient first.
5.2 Process
The first clinical assistant picks up the most serious patient from the waiting list. Then,
the waiting list is updated by eliminating the selected patient which has been assessed as
the most critical patient. Thus, the number of patients remaining becomes four.
Strategies are generated by following the process introduced in Chapter 3. In our
validation, 4! strategies are generated since there are four entities available in our scenario.
We evaluate the expected utility of each strategy and choose the one with the optimal
utility. There are several steps to evaluate the expected utility with following.
We set values of parameters of each entity based on the profile of the current patient.
We already know some information of each entity such as attentional state factor, special-
ized area, and the number of patients the entity has treated. Then, we set the following
parameters: lack of expertise factor, probability of response for answer, and probability of
response for how quickly the entity will respond, bc inc fac, and Init. Those parameter
values affect to determine the bother cost of each entity.
Obtain Parameter Values We obtain lack of expertise factor of the entity based on
the medical problem of the patient and the history of the entity.
We obtain user unwillingness factor by adding attentional state factor to lack of exper-
tise factor. With user unwillingness factor, we determine a value of probability of response
for each case such as “Yes,” “No,” and “Silence” according to the Table 3.5.
We can also find the probability of response timing, which represents how quickly the
entity will respond.
We finally obtain the value of bc inc fac and calculate another variable Init by following
the formulae introduced in Section 3.2.2.
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Update task criticality We update the task criticality(TC) of the current patient with
the increasing rate based on how critical he/she is as time passes according to Table 3.3.
Setting EQ The EQ values are also set with different EQ weights as time passes
according to Table 3.4.
Calculation of EU We calculate the expected utility for each FTOC node for “Yes”,
SG node for “No”, and Default node for “Silence”. After aggregating the expected utility
value for each node, we evaluate the final expected utility value of the current strategy
chain. This results in the strategy that is best to execute.
5.3 Execution
Obtain the answer and response time
We ask the best entity on the best strategy chain. He/she would have a function of
probability of response as shown in Table 3.5 based on his/her willingness.
The entity will answer “Yes”, “No” or “Silence” based on probability of response as
shown in Table 3.5. With the current user unwillingness factor, we get information about
when the entity will answer the question and which answer will be given. For example, if
the user unwillingness factor is Willing, the probability to answer “Yes” is 60%. We use a
uniform distribution. In other words, our simulation generates a random number between
0 and 10. If the random number is between 0 and 6, our simulation considers that the
answer is “Yes”. If the random number is between 6 and 8, the answer is considered as
“No”. Otherwise, we consider that the response from the entity is silence.
After obtaining the type of answer, we use another uniform distribution to simulate
when the entity responded to the question. If the answer is silence, the response time
becomes 5 unit time. Otherwise, we generate a random number between 0 and 80 and
see which number is generated. If the entity is a Willing person, the entity would give a
response which may be either “Yes” or “No” in 1 unit time with the probability of 33% as
designed in Table 3.6. Thus, if the random number generated from the uniform distribution
is between 0 and 33, we consider that the entity responded in 1 unit time after being asked.
Also, the entity a has probability of 27% to respond in 2 unit time, 13% in 3 unit time, and
7% in 4 unit time. Therefore, if the random number drawn from the uniform distribution
between 0 and 80 1 is between 33 and 60, 2 unit time is given to the entity as response
1We modeled that the probability of response for the case of silence as 20% for any type of user
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time. If it is between 60 and 73, 3 unit time is given. Otherwise, 4 unit time is given as
the entity response time to the question.
Update task criticality of the current patient
We learned about when the entity will respond from the last step. Since the current patient
should wait for a response from the entity, we increase the task criticality of the current
patient during the response time. Examples are as follows:
1. If the expected response is “Yes” in 3 unit time and the current task criticality of
the patient is 85, the expected task criticality in 3 unit time is calculated as follows:
• In 1 unit time,
TC = current TC + current TC × Increasing Rate = 85 + 85× 0.1 = 93.5
• In 2 unit time,
TC = 93.5 + 93.5× 0.1 = 102.85
• In 3 unit time,
TC = 102.85 + 102.85× 0.1 = 113.135
If the task criticality of the a patient increased over 100, we model this as a problem
patient. In this case, the patient becomes dead before he/she gets a response from
the entity. We put the patient on the Dead List.
2. If the expected response is “Yes” in 2 unit time, and the current task criticality of
the patient is 78, the expected task criticality in 2 unit time is calculated as follows:
• After 1 unit time,
TC = current TC + current TC × Increasing Rate = 78 + 78× 0.05 = 81.9
• After 2 unit time,
TC = 81.9 + 81.9× 0.1 = 90.09
After 1 unit time, 5% was applied as an increasing rate as task criticality of the
patient is Medium, but 10% was applied in 2 unit time since task criticality of the
patient became High. In this case, the patient is still alive before he/she get a
response from the entity. Since the entity’s answer to the question is “Yes”, the
patient will be taken by the entity.
unwillingness factor. In other words, the probability of response for the case of “Yes” and “No” is always
80%. Thus, we arranged the range of the distribution to be between 0 and 80 for convenience in our
calculation.
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3. If the expected response is “No” in 2 unit time, and the current task criticality of
the patient is 78, the expected task criticality in 2 unit time is calculated as follows:
• In 1 unit time,
TC = current TC + current TC × Increasing Rate = 78 + 78× 0.05 = 81.9
• In 2 unit time,
TC = 81.9 + 81.9× 0.1 = 90.09
After 1 unit time, 5% was applied as an increasing rate as task criticality of the
patient was Medium, but 10% was applied in 2 unit time since task criticality of of
the patient became High. In this case, the patient is still alive before he/she get a
response from the entity. However, the patient still need to wait for a while to see
a doctor because the expected doctor answered “No”. In our model, we regenerate
a strategy chain reflecting current parameter values and repeat asking an entity on
the new strategy. Meanwhile, task criticality of other patients on the waiting list is
increased by the increasing rate corresponding to the task criticality of them.
4. If the expected response is silence, and the current task criticality of the patient is
45, we need to calculate the the expected task criticality in 5 unit time.
• In 1 unit time,
TC = current TC + current TC × Increasing Rate = 45 + 45× 0.05 = 47.25
• In 2 unit time,
TC = 47.25 + 47.25× 0.05 = 49.6125
• In 3 unit time,
TC = 49.6125 + 49.6125× 0.05 = 52.0931
• In 4 unit time,
TC = 52.0931 + 52.0931× 0.05 = 54.6978
• In 5 unit time,
TC = 54.6978 + 54.6978× 0.05 = 57.4327
5% was applied as an increasing rate as task criticality of the patient was Medium.
In this case, the patient is still alive before he/she get a response from the entity.
However, the patient still needs to wait for a while to see a doctor because the
expected doctor answered nothing rather than “Yes”. In our model, we ask the
second best doctor on the strategy chain and wait for the response from the doctor.
If there is no next doctor left, we regenerate a strategy chain as is done in the case
of “No”.
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Check the status of patients on the waiting list
As time passes, task criticality of patients on the waiting list increases. If task criticality
of any patients become more than 100, we consider that the patient is dead at that point.
Our simulation first selects the patient whose task criticality is highest.
5.4 Simulations
5.4.1 Time Cost and Bother Cost
This validation measures performance of our model reflecting dynamic and time critical
aspects by comparing it with one that is missing the calculation of bother cost. In the
setting of our validation simulating hospital emergency scenarios, there are four entities on
the entity list and five patients on the waiting list.
Every patient has a task criticality for his/her specific medical problem, and the task
criticality of each patient is changed dynamically as time progresses. Our simulation first
selects the patient whose task criticality is highest.
The number of patients the entity has treated so far is used to determine weather
the entity has experience for a particular medical problem for the profile recorded. For
example, we consider the entity as an expert if he has treated more than 100 patients for
the specific medical problem. Otherwise, the entity is considered as novice for the specific
medical problem.
We then obtain a strategy chain by calculating formulae (Equation 3.4, 3.9, 3.10)
reflecting our model based on the patient’s profile (medical problem and criticality). After
choosing a entity in the chain, we ask him/her to treat the current patient and update
the criticality of patients who have been treated by entities, as well as those remaining on
the waiting list. If a patient has not been attended to (i.e. no doctor has replied “yes”),
the task criticality of the patient increases as time passes. If the task criticality of the
a patient increased over 100, we model this as a problem patient. When there are no
more patients on the waiting list, we finally count the number of problem patients. By
comparing the number of problem patients simulated by our model with bother cost and
without bother cost, we can validate whether our model reflects dynamic and time critical
domains effectively.
Figure 5.1 illustrates the distribution generated by our model with Bother Cost and
without Bother Cost. The graph on the left represents the case of 4 entities and 5 patients
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Figure 5.1: Our model with and without Bother Cost
and one on the right represents the case of 6 entities and 5 patients. The x-axis of each
graph denotes the number of problem patients, and the y-axis the frequency of each value
on x-axis after running our simulation 100 times. The solid line represents the version
including Bother Cost, and the dotted line represents the version excluding Bother Cost.
In Figure 5.1, we can find the peak of the dotted line located in a higher position than
the peak of the line at 4 on the x-axis and inclined to the right. This implies that there
have been more problem patients during simulations with the version without Bother Cost
(dotted line) than one with Bother Cost (solid line). In other words, the version calculating
Bother Cost outperforms the one which does not calculate Bother Cost by comparing the
number of problem patients on the graphs.
5.4.2 Strategy Regeneration
In this experiment, we compare the version with a SG node for strategy regeneration to
the one without the SG node. As shown in Section 3.1.3, there is a SG node where a new
strategy chain is generated if the response from the entity is “No” to reflect the aspect of
real-time and dynamic environments. For the version excluding the SG node, we simply
moved to the next world and asked the next entity instead of strategy regeneration.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the distribution generated by our model with strategy regeneration
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Figure 5.2: Our model with and without a SG node
and without strategy regeneration. The graph on the left represents the case of 4 entities
and 5 patients and one on the right represents the case of 6 entities and 5 patients. The
x-axis of each graph denotes the number of problem patients, and the y-axis the frequency
of each value on x-axis after running our simulation 100 times. The solid line represents
the version including a SG node, and the dotted line represents the version excluding the
SG node.
In Figure 5.2, we can find the peak of the solid line at 4 on the x-axis and inclined to
the right. However, the peak of the dotted line is spotted at 5 on the x-axis. This implies
that 4 problem patients are mostly found under the version with strategy regeneration but
5 problem patients under the version without strategy regeneration. In other words, the
version including a SG node outperforms the one which does not regenerate a strategy
chain.
5.4.3 Task Criticality
In this experiment, we compare the version with weights by task criticality of the patients
to the one without weights. The expected quality of decision of each entity is determined
by his/her lack of expertise factor as presented in Formula 3.10. In this section, we compare
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Figure 5.3: Our model with and without weights
the version with weights and the one without weights. The version without weights implies
that every entity has equal expected quality of decision.
Figure 5.3 illustrates the distribution generated by our model with strategy regeneration
and without weights. The graph on the left represents the case of 4 entities and 5 patients
and one on the right represents the case of 6 entities and 5 patients. The x-axis of each
graph denotes the number of problem patients, and the y-axis the frequency of each value
on x-axis after running our simulation 100 times. The solid line represents the version
reflecting weights, and the dotted line represents the version excluding weights. In Figure
5.3, we can find the peak of the dotted line located in a higher position than the peak of
the line at 4 on the x-axis and inclined to the right. This implies that there have been more
problem patients during simulations with the version without weights (dotted line) than
one reflecting weights (solid line). In other words, the version with weights outperforms
the one which does not reflect weights by comparing the number of problem patients on
the graphs.
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Table 5.1: Profiles of entities at the time the patient arrives
e1 e2 e3 e4
Attentional State Factor Relaxed Busy Busy Relaxed
Lack-of-expertise Factor Low High Low High
5.5 Level of Expertise
We illustrate the value of the Lack of Expertise factor through an example. Table 5.1
displays the Attentional State and Lack of Expertise of each of the four entities, at the
beginning.
5.5.1 With Level of Expertise
In our example, a patient has just arrived at the emergency room. The first clinical
assistant (FCA) assesses him as highly critical, whose task criticality is 85 for the medical
problem on his Neuro. The FCA tries to search for the right doctor for the current patient.
Our system checks the profile of each doctor and begins finding out the optimal strategy
by calculating an expected utility for each generated strategy. Since there are four doctors,
we obtain 4! strategies. By evaluating each strategy, we obtain 24 expected utility values
for each strategy. The greatest expected utility is EU(s) = 110.03 whose strategy chain is
e1 - e2 - e4 - e3.
The strategies that choose to ask e4 first do not have high EU values, even though the
expert is not Busy and can attend to the patient. This is because the High Criticality of
the patient has raised the weight of the EQ value in the calculation. The maximal EU
of a strategy that asks e4 first is 95.75 as represented in Table 5.2. Likewise, strategies
that select e2 first have very low EU values, as this expert is both Busy and with High
Lack of Expertise Factor.
5.5.2 Without Level of Expertise
Each entity has its own Lack of Expertise Factor of either High, Med or Low. However,
we set Lack of Expertise Factors of all the entities into Med. The greatest expected
utility is EU(s) = 110.37 whose strategy chains are e1 - e4 - e3 - e2, e1 - e4 - e2 - e3, e4 - e1
- e3 - e2, and e4 - e1 - e2 - e3 as shown in Table 5.3. We find that there are four different
62
Table 5.2: Expected utility of strategies at the time the patient arrives
No. Expected Utility (EU) Strategy Chain
1 109.158054 e1 - e2 - e3 - e4
2 110.031364 e1 - e2 - e4 - e3
3 103.040701 e1 - e3 - e2 - e4
4 102.608701 e1 - e3 - e4 - e2
5 106.566054 e1 - e4 - e3 - e2
6 107.871364 e1 - e4 - e2 - e3
7 107.738381 e2 - e1 - e3 - e4
8 108.611691 e2 - e1 - e4 - e3
9 101.726617 e2 - e3 - e1 - e4
10 101.444457 e2 - e3 - e4 - e1
11 105.390556 e2 - e4 - e3 - e1
12 106.557280 e2 - e4 - e1 - e3
13 71.066750 e3 - e2 - e1 - e4
14 70.784590 e3 - e2 - e4 - e1
15 70.961161 e3 - e1 - e2 - e4
16 70.529161 e3 - e1 - e4 - e2
17 68.474750 e3 - e4 - e1 - e2
18 68.624590 e3 - e4 - e2 - e1
19 94.590556 e4 - e2 - e3 - e1
20 95.757280 e4 - e2 - e1 - e3
21 88.484457 e4 - e3 - e2 - e1
22 88.334617 e4 - e3 - e1 - e2
23 94.346381 e4 - e1 - e3 - e2
24 95.651691 e4 - e1 - e2 - e3
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strategy chains which were generated with the same EU because there is indifferent between
High expertise medical experts and Low expertise experts. For example, e1 and e4 are
exchangeable on the strategy chain since their user unwillingness factor is same each other.
However, if e4 is chosen as the first entity, our patient would not be treated properly
because e4 has no experience for the medical problem.
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Table 5.3: Expected utility of strategies at the time the patient arrives
No. Expected Utility (EU) Strategy Chain
1 108.657664 e1 - e2 - e3 - e4
2 108.700761 e1 - e2 - e4 - e3
3 108.657664 e1 - e3 - e2 - e4
4 108.700761 e1 - e3 - e4 - e2
5 110.366391 e1 - e4 - e3 - e2
6 110.366391 e1 - e4 - e2 - e3
7 95.250357 e2 - e1 - e3 - e4
8 95.293454 e2 - e1 - e4 - e3
9 93.584726 e2 - e3 - e1 - e4
10 93.584726 e2 - e3 - e4 - e1
11 95.250357 e2 - e4 - e3 - e1
12 95.293454 e2 - e4 - e1 - e3
13 93.584726 e3 - e2 - e1 - e4
14 93.584726 e3 - e2 - e4 - e1
15 95.250357 e3 - e1 - e2 - e4
16 95.293454 e3 - e1 - e4 - e2
17 95.293454 e3 - e4 - e1 - e2
18 95.250357 e3 - e4 - e2 - e1
19 108.657664 e4 - e2 - e3 - e1
20 108.700761 e4 - e2 - e1 - e3
21 108.657664 e4 - e3 - e2 - e1
22 108.700761 e4 - e3 - e1 - e2
23 110.366391 e4 - e1 - e3 - e2




In this chapter, we begin by presenting future work, commenting further on how to make the
calculations of our framework more complex. We then include a contrast with other related
work, including other efforts on designing mixed-initiative systems and other research on
reasoning about interaction with users, sensitive to bother. We end with a summary of the
contributions of the thesis.
6.1 Future Work
6.1.1 Sensor and Learning Techniques
One valuable topic for future work is how best to set the various parameter values. Some
parameter values could possibly obtained from sensors attached to the medical experts
being modeled. We would need to determine how often the sensor check the status of
the doctors and send information to the system. If the status has been checked by sensor
and sent to the system frequently, our system could reflect the aspect of dynamic and
real-time settings more effectively. However, the heavy loads might be required to work
out frequently.
The hSITE project ([22]) aims to integrate sensor readings into the overall decision
making in hospital environments and to integrate as well an effective networking of the
various devices used within the hospital. One could imagine, for instance, being able to
assess the attentional state of the medical experts based on devices which register patient
status. In addition, the time and location of the medical experts could be known and
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this could be another influence in determining the expected quality of decision, if asking a
particular expert (e.g. experts who are very far away may be less able to quickly assist a
critical patient). Integrating sensor data into the determination of parameter values is in
general an interesting topic for future research.
We may also use learning techniques to obtain parameter values instead of using in-
formation from the sensor. The parameter values obtained by using learning techniques
might not reflect the current situation as effectively as using the sensor, but it may give
the system less burden to use the learning techniques.
In order to acquire the values of some of the existing parameters in the model described
in Chapters 3 and 4, we are interested in using machine learning methods. We can classify
different machine learning algorithms, based on the desired outcome of the algorithm as
follows [25]. First, supervised learning is for learning a function from training data. The
training data consist of pairs of input objects and desired outputs. Second, unsupervised
learning models a set of inputs: labeled examples are not available. Third, semi-supervised
learning combines both examples to generate an appropriate function or classifier. Finally,
reinforcement learning learns how to act given an observation of the world. Every action
has some impacts in the environment, and the environment provides feedback in the form
of rewards that guides the learning algorithms.
We are especially interested in the active learning method [17] in the category of super-
vised learning since this method is more appropriate for dynamic and real-time situations.
By the active learning, we may determine the value of variables which are changed dynam-
ically. As seeing the characteristic of each variable, we can find the fact that Attention
State Factor can be determined by this learning method. That is, we may classify the
degree of how busy doctors are by the active learning method, and each classified cluster
may represent the value of the parameter, Attention State Factor.
A useful starting point for investigating active learning for reasoning about interruption
is the work of Kapoor and Horvitz [17] which advocates the use of active learning through
experience sampling to determine the benefit of predictive models against the cost of the
probes to obtain parameter values.
6.1.2 Probability of Response
Our current calculation for the probability of response uses an estimate based on the
user unwillingness factor of the medical expert. Various default values are employed; for
example, we assume that the probability of silence is the same, for all medical experts. For
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future work, it would be valuable to integrate into the estimate for probability of response
a calculation of how much stress the doctor has been under, due to workload with patients
that day. For example, we could measure how long the doctor has been with a status
of Relaxed and determine the parameter value of Stress Level Factor. If the doctor has
been relaxed longer than other doctors at this point, we could say that more relaxed doctor
would have less stress. Sensor information could be sent to our system and this can help to
determine the parameter value. Alternatively, we could simply be recording in time spent
with patients for that particular medical expert and reduce our expectations of a successful
probability of response for those who have been overworked that day.
We could also be modeling more carefully whether the expert’s attention state factor
is likely to be reduced soon, based on when the expert became busy and how much time
has past.
6.1.3 Attention State Factor
The Attention State Factor represents the attention state of the user. For instance, a user
is more interruptible when resting than when he/she is busy with important work [7]. In
our scenario, this variable will determine how busy doctors are currently. We can measure
the value of this variable by checking how many hours are needed to finish a current task
the doctors are undertaking. This factor changes over time under the dynamic situation
in our hospital setting.
For simplicity, if the doctor is currently handling any patient, we consider him/her as
the doctor with a status of Busy. If not, we consider him/her as the one with a status of
Relaxed. We could potentially obtain this parameter value by checking a sensor attached
to the doctor. The sensor will check whether the doctor is currently having a patient.
6.1.4 Lack of Expertise Factor
In order to obtain the value of Lack of Expertise Factor, we need to keep track of the
history of behavior of the medical expert from database in hospital. We can count the
number of patients who have been treated by the doctor to figure out how the doctor
has expertise for the specific patient. If the doctor has handled more than one thousand
patients having the specific symptom, the doctor would be considered as more skilled
expert than other doctors having treated five hundreds patients. In our model, we classify
medical experts as three groups: less skilled experts, medium skilled experts, and more
68
skilled experts. More skilled experts are given a status, Low, and the others are given a
status, High for the parameter of Lack of Expertise Factor.
This current model can become more sophisticated. A more precise representation of
the kind of problem that the current patient is exhibiting may better determine whether
the medical expert in question has sufficient expertise. In addition, a class of problems
should all be addressible equally by any medical expert (i.e. do not require considerable
specific previous experience). In these cases, it may simply be the status of the medical
expert (e.g intern compared to longterm practitioner) that makes the most difference. We
note as well that as medical experts elect to take on more patients, their level of expertise
will need to be adjusted.
6.1.5 User Unwillingness Factor
The user unwillingness Factor is the user’s unwillingness to interact with the system. This
is a measure of how receptive the user is towards being TOC’ed, and how disrupted they
are by interruptions[Cheng, Fleming, and Cohen 05’]. This value is related to the expertise
of each doctor. If one doctor is good at the medical problem of the current patient because
of his/her expertise, the doctor may be willing to do treat the patient. Otherwise, he/she
will not help the patient and the doctor’s User unwillingness Factor may become higher.
If we view this variable in respect of the expertise of each doctor, we are able to conclude
the fact that this variable is not directly related to the dynamic and real-time situations.
Currently, user unwillingness is simply calculated in terms of attentional state and lack
of expertise. We could instead construct detailed user models more carefully, determining
just how inherently willing this particular expert appears to be, when asked to assist (from
previous scenarios). The inherent user willingness would then have to be integrated with
the current calculation to determine the most appropriate value.
6.1.6 Expected Quality of Decision
To decide which doctor has a higher quality of decision, we considered his/her special-
ized area for the medical problem to figure out which expert is more knowledgable for the
specific patient. In other words, we assumed that a doctor is knowledgable when the spe-
cialized area of the expert is matched with the medical problem of the patient. However,
there might be various methods to evaluate knowledge of doctors and several factors to
affect evaluating expected quality of decision after evaluating knowledge of the doctors.
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Experiences of each doctor in hospital such as how long they have worked or which educa-
tion they have obtained would be beneficial to gain information for estimating the expected
quality of decision.
6.1.7 Enhancing the PTOC Question
In our current model, the question that each medical expert is asked is “Can you help
with the current patient?”. We can imagine making this communication more informative,
indicating at least the basic area of the patient’s problem or perhaps a very specific initial
diagnosis. In this case, the expert’s response may be altered (for example a very busy
doctor who realizes he is the most expert may decide to say “Yes”). If more information
were flowing, then our modeling which estimates probability of response would have to be
adjusted as well.
6.1.8 Calculating the Timing in the Strategy Chains
Currently, the time to wait for the first entity in a strategy chain before then asking the
next is determined on the basis of fixed values and estimations of probability of response.
For future work, we could in fact explore more detailed algorithms to try to optimize the
times at which each strategy moves on to consider the next entity in its chain. Our starting
point for this research would be the methods proposed by Cheng [6] motivated by those
introduced in the E-Elves project [27] where one uses an expected utility equation with
an integral as in Section 2.4 and then differentiates solving for the t value that makes the
equation equal to zero.
6.1.9 Revisiting Strategy Regeneration
At the moment, we assume there is no cost for strategy regeneration. While it is definitely
valuable to proceed with updated parameter values, this will at least consume some time.
We leave open for future work a more careful consideration of the value of the strategy
regeneration cost.
We have also limited the length of strategies being generated, allowing the same entity
to be consulted only once in a given strategy chain. For future work, we could extend
the model to give up this restriction. Continuing to include strategy regeneration would
then require an algorithm for when that generation should take place. In addition, it may
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make sense to reconsider the same expert within a chain, if that person is changing their
attentional status (busy back to relaxed) or expertise level (to be increased).
It may also be interesting to vary the need for strategy regeneration based on the task
at hand. Very critical patients may introduce an even greater need to regenerate strategy
values frequently.
Finally, when the number of possible experts becomes quite high we may consider
techniques for reducing the number of strategies that are generated, as discussed in [6].
For example, not considering all the possible p experts or grouping experts into types where
parameters are all modeled similarly.
6.1.10 Task and Resource Allocation Problem
At the moment, our framework is developed in order to determine the best strategy (i.e.
which entities to ask, how long to wait before asking another entity, etc.) to address the
current task. In hospital emergency scenarios, this is the task of caring for the current
patient.
In general, in dynamic environments there will be multiple tasks that need to be ad-
dressed at once and multiple resources that can be brought to bear in order to address
those tasks (e.g. the different medical experts, for the hospital application).
In Chapter 5, we simply processed each new patient sequentially. For future work,
we would explore a multiagent extension to our current framework. As in the work of
Cheng [6], one approach we could investigate is effectively coordinating the requests for
assistance that each task requires. In particular, Cheng proposes that each agent have a
proxy who handles requests for the agent to assume decision making, which may arrive from
any number of other agents in the system. In the hospital decision making scenario, this
would involve having one medical expert being asked to assist with several different current
patients at once (simply because he is considered to be the agent with the best expected
quality of decision, relative to bother cost). The challenge is in effectively modeling the cost
of bother, if the estimates for bother cost are possibly stale (unaware of any simultaneous
requests for assistance with this expert or having a stale model of the expert’s current
attentional state). In Cheng, proxy agents could use a verification procedure, requiring
each agent asking the expert for assistance to also indicate their estimate of the expert’s
current bother cost and being provided with a more accurate estimate from the proxy, if
this is in fact quite out of sync with the expert’s current state. The agent who had put
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the expert into its transfer-of-control strategy could then recompute, possibly asking a
different expert.
With real-time settings, it would be important not to lose significant time approaching
experts who are unlikely to assist, due to other current committments. But it would also be
challenging to properly model the precise attentional state of each expert, because simply
being asked to assist in a strategy being executed for a current patient would not ensure
that the expert will say “Yes” and would actually be assisting.
What would ultimately be needed is some kind of effective task and resource allocation
scheme, whereby tasks that are executed simultaneously do not try to make use of exactly
the same resources at the same time. Research which may be of value to examine for
insights includes that of Decker and Li [9] that views the problem of patient scheduling in
hospitals as a multiagent coordination question.
6.1.11 Exploring Hospital Scenarios
In Chapter 5, we presented experimental results from simulations which monitored the
number of problem patients that would arise, due to various algorithms. We had orig-
inally planned to label these as “dead patients”, since they were in a critical state and
were unattended. In reality, hospitals will try hard to have these patients attended to in
some manner, but as their level of criticality rises beyond a certain point, we have simply
indicated that they are a problem because they may begin to incur a significant cost to the
hospital. The certain point can be determined by measuring the value of blood pressure,
breadth, and purse patients have. For future work, we could interact further with medical
professionals to gain greater insights into how very critical patients are managed while
waiting for their primary care.
We could as well learn how to model in some respects the economic considerations of
patient care for emergency room scenarios. In particular, currently hospitals in Ontario
are being judged according to their patient throughput and this is to impact the funding
that they will receive. For this reason, it will become even more important for the most
effective medical experts to be brought in to care for these patients.
The examples that we introduced in Chapter 4 indicated the best strategy chain to
execute, in order to result in the highest overall utility. Another direction for future
research would be to determine the importance of running the strategy with the top utility,
compared to other choices where the utility value is only somewhat lower. The side-
effects of operating at a lower level of utility could be investigated, to shed some light
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on the significance of the actual utility values. This might be done for instance through
simulations.
Ultimately, it would be most valuable to conduct a thorough user study with medical
professionals who operate in hospital settings. As a first step, we plan to learn more about
the challenges to hospital workflow faced by these medical experts through the research
that is currently being conducted by Diane Doran and her team, as part of the hSITE
project. At that stage of the project, the use of sensors may also be involved as part of
the information gathering during hospital scenarios.
Another element of the modeling of hospital scenarios that would be valuable to explore
is the extent to which each patient’s care is in fact reliant on multiple resources, working
together. As each current patient relies not only on multiple experts but perhaps multiple
kinds of equipment (which may or may not be available), there may be interesting chal-
lenges in reasoning about whether the group that is required to attend to the patient can
in fact be assembled appropriately.
6.1.12 Exploring other Application Areas
Currently, we have projected our framework into the application area of hospital decision
making. For future work, it would be worthwhile to explore the use of this framework for
distinct applications where it is important to be reasoning about interaction with users,
sensitive to bother and where there may be time critical conditions. One application of
particular relevance is that of handling real-world emergencies such as fires, to be attending
to by fire brigades. While often the solutions for addressing these problems are resolved
by algorithms for dispatching available resources1, one can imagine modeling more effec-
tively the tendency for certain units to respond quickly or not (reflecting a kind of lack of
expertise) or to be modeling the extent to which the current units are currently busy (so
not simply a binary state of being busy or not but a continuum of values).
1I have spent time as working on dispatching vehicles for a fire brigade in South Korea
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6.2 Contrast with Related Work
6.2.1 Modeling Bother
Our formulae for modeling the cost of bothering users are extensions of those used in
Cheng’s research [6], making use of an Initial bother cost reflective of the kind of question
being asked, a bother increasing function reflective of this particular user, the bother
endured by the user so far. In addition, we discuss how these parameters should be
updated after strategy chains are executed and how our new lack of expertise factor would
influence the user’s unwillingness which forms part of the bother cost calculation.
This formulation is distinct from various other efforts by artificial intelligence re-
searchers to model the cost of interrupting users. For example Bauer [2] proposes the
inclusion of differing kinds bother increases so that users who are inherently unwilling to
be bothered may have this factor increased exponentially whereas more relaxed users can
have a log-like increase in their bother. But the nature of the penalty function for bother
is not formulated explicitly. In this framework, users do indeed get more bothered with
each successive query, in what they refer to as an annoy factor.
Raskutti and Zukerman [23] look at what is referred to as a nuisance factor when
reasoning about which disambiguating query to issue, when interacting with a user. We
are less focused on the choice of query in our current framework. They also examine the
the number of additional queries that will likely come to the same user, once the initial
interaction is generated. As we discussed in Section 6.1.7 above, if we extend our framework
to be providing additional information when we approach an expert to take on the current
task, we might then consider the cost that would likely arise from an additional ongoing
dialogue, as generating bother. The suggestion that some questions carry more bother
than others is at least reflected in part in our decision to have a high base bother cost with
our query that asks users to assume the decision making.
Various researchers are considering the interruptability of users as critical to the design
of any intelligent interface. Horvitz et al.’s COORDINATE system [16] allows users to
indicate beforehand how interruptible they are during certain meetings. While we currently
consider a user’s unwillingness to be a reflection of their recorded attentional state and lack
of expertise, we could additionally allow, for instance in the medical application, experts
to declare themselves as highly disposed against interruption as they head into handling
critical tasks, themselves (and to reset this value when their current task is complete).
Horvitz’s follow up research [15] does move on to consider an attentional state factor and
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this motivated the inclusion of such a factor in Cheng’s work [6], which has carried over to
our own model.
Bailey et al. [1] also have interesting research to confirm that a user’s interruptability
is reflective of their mental load at the time of interruption. This again suggests a more
careful modeling, for future work, of the precise current task of each expert who is recorded
currently as busy, distinguishing those experts who may be less able to cope with a pos-
sible interruption (and thus adjusting our parameter values when calculating strategies).
We note that Bailey’s work is more experimental and psychological, to compliment the
development of models by artificial intelligence researchers.
6.2.2 Mixed-Initiative Systems
Although our current framework reasons about which entities to ask within a strategy
chain and is therefore concerned with the multi-user case, we focus on a decision for how
to handle the current task and as such are offering a process for whether to interact with
a particular user, similar to what is examined by researchers designing mixed-initiative
systems. A Good overview of mixed-initiative system is provided in [10] and [13].
As in the work of Fleming [11], our approach is one of deciding whether to interact with
a user based on various user modeling parameters and on the basis of the expected quality
of decision. This is in contrast with other efforts concerned with whether to interact with
users, which address differing subproblems.
The work of Cesta and D’Aloisi [5] advocates a task driven control of how the initiative
will shift within the system. This aligns well with our decision to focus on resolving the
current task and determining the appropriate strategy of who to ask, at that point. This
work also suggests that the user be allowed to control the decision making. It would
be interesting for us to explore this possibility, within the context of our framework; for
example, experts who became free could request that tasks be assigned to them, this
signalling the value of a regeneration of strategies currently underway. Rich and Sidner [24]
discuss the value of a shared plan known to both the user and the system, while the system
reasons about interacting with the user. Future directions for our research might also
explore how best to convey the current set of tasks that are underway, when interaction is
initiated with an expert.
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6.2.3 Adjustable Autonomy Systems
Our framework specifies the best strategy chain to execute in an effort to bring the most
appropriate expert to attend to the task at hand. It integrates a process of asking other
experts if a positive response is not received from the entities earlier in the chain. As such,
this is a proposal for adjustable autonomy of the agent handling the task that is modeled
on the framework provided in the E-Elves project [27].
Distinct from Cheng’s approach, we do not consider differing questions to ask our
entities, but we instead provide a kind of middle-ground solution whereby, as with Cheng’s
work, we allow a question to be asked of an expert, we allow for a response to that
question (either yes or no, or the case of silence). The question acts as an initiation of
the full transfer-of-control. This contrasts with Cheng’s separation of PTOCs and FTOCs
as two distinct nodes in the strategies that are considered. This is also distinct from the
proposal of Tambe et al. who do not allow for users to be asked questions per se.
There is a variety of other research in the design of adjustable autonomy multiagent sys-
tems which generally focuses on differing concerns. For example, Schreckenghost et al. [28]
view the challenge of adjustable autonomy in multi-user scenarios as best addressed by
methods employed for coordination and communication in multiagent systems. Similar to
Cheng, they introduce proxy agents who assist in the coordination, including an overall
Crew Proxy (for the application of space crew management) to assist in notifying agents
of incoming events and selecting the best methods for offloading the autonomy, for the
resolution of tasks. This research suggests further exploration of proxy agents to be un-
derstanding the current limitations of each entity that may be approached to take on a
current task.
Berry et al. [3] comment on the challenges of honouring preferences of users for tasks
such as meeting scheduling. This provides some backing for approaches such as ours where
which experts are consulted is simply driven by the predominant needs of the current task.
Martin et al. [21] point out that in multi-user environments there may be challenges
when different agents are soliciting the assistance of the same, other agents (or when
two parties may be asking each other to take on their current task). They refer to this
as the problem of interfering with each other’s commands. This work may provide some
insights into how to manage the case of multiple patients needing assistance simultaneously,
outlined in Section 6.1.10 above.
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6.2.4 User Modeling for Healthcare Applications
Our research is aimed at contributing to the mandate of the hSITE project [22]: delivering
the right information to the right people at the right time. In particular, we determine
who the right people are and what the right time to ask each person is. Our procedure
forms part of the modeling required in hSITE’s Theme 1: determining the overall workflow
(outlined for the particular use of in-hospital decision making).
Other researchers have been exploring the value of user modeling towards the improve-
ment of healthcare services. A special issue of the UMUAI journal is forthcoming [8]. Some
of the other work that is relevant to this topic includes efforts to personalize the delivery
of health information to users (e.g. [4]) and projects to give users control over their user
model, for more effective health promotion (e.g. [19]).
6.2.5 Real-Time Decision Making
One of the primary challenges that we examine in this thesis is that of coping with a need
for quick decisions, in real-time dynamic environments. Altering the algorithms that have
been designed for intelligent automated reasoning to be more time sensitive is another
topic that other researchers have explored.
Included here are efforts by multiagent systems researchers in applications such as
RoboCup Search and Rescue [20] where algorithms need to be designed to coordinate
the activities of emergency medical, police and firefighting robots to rescue civilians after
an earthquake. In particular, the model of Micacchi, Cheng and Cohen [18] leverages
interaction between agents to ensure that parameters are up to date for more effective real-
time decision making, for this application. This suggests that our strategy regeneration
procedure, to determine current parameter values at periodic intervals is of general value.
6.3 Conclusions
This thesis has examined the challenge of having agents reason about whether to interact
with users, in multiagent, multi-user scenarios where each agent has been tasked with
operating autonomously to solve a problem on behalf of its user, and in environments where
the tasks may have critical time constraints and the parameter values may be dynamically
changing. In contrast with previous work on formulating transfer-of-control strategies
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for multiagent adjustable autonomy systems, we propose a strategy regeneration process
that limits the lengths of the strategy chains and results in updated parameter values
for the decision-theoretic reasoning. We demonstrate that this strategy regeneration is
effective, through a simulation in the application of hospital emergency room decision
making, showing the benefits of the regeneration of values, towards successfully completing
the tasks that are being transferred to the entities in each strategy chain. This begins to
provide some insights into how the dynamic nature of the environment can be considered as
part of the determination of the most effective transfer-of-control strategies. We restrict our
focus to effectively addressing each new task, sequentially and discuss possible extensions
to this procedure that address multiple tasks simultaneously.
We also explore in greater detail the user modeling requirements for designing effective
transfer-of-control strategies in scenarios that are time and task critical. In particular,
we first introduce a parameter that models the level of expertise of each entity, of use in
more effectively modeling the expected quality of decision from this entity. We integrate
this parameter into our calculation of a user’s willingness to accept a transfer-of-control
(equating less expertise with less willingness), of use in applications where there is a clear
understanding of the users’ expertise towards the possible tasks at hand. This provides
a richer modeling of the user unwillingess factor than that employed in previous models,
which was largely predicated on deriving an initial estimate for each user based on their
stereotype or through explicit acquisition (e.g. a survey).
We also introduce an explicit modeling of the criticality of the task at hand and propose
an weighting adjustment for the balance between the expected quality of decision and the
cost of bother, relative to the task criticality. We are thus able to place greater demands on
the quality of decision for more critical tasks and to reduce the focus on the cost of bother.
This proposal is in contrast to other approaches in the field which offer varying methods
for modeling bother, but do not reason about this factor relative to the importance of the
quality of decision provided by the user with whom interaction has been initiated.
In order to demonstrate that our proposed formulae for modeling users are effective,
we offer some detailed examples where there is tension between the need for an effective
decision and the possible cost of bother and discuss the value of our particular results.
We also provide a simulation to show that our modeling of bother in particular is effec-
tive, compared to a case where bother cost has not been modeled when reasoning about
transfering control for addressing current tasks in an environment.
As such, we begin to outline how the modeling of the task and of the user as part of
the overall process for reasoning about interaction can be designed effectively, for dynamic
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environments with time critical constraints.
We also project our model into the specific application of hospital emergency room
decision making, outlining how the various parameters serve to model the current patients
and the medical experts and exploring appropriate qualitative values to employ, to distin-
guish the user models in this environment (e.g. Attentional State ranging from relaxed to
busy). We propose to be running our algorithm for reasoning about transfers of control
to have a current patient attended to, driving the actual interaction with existing medical
professionals. Our proposal for constructing a strategy chain provides for a quick change to
eliciting the assistance of a different expert, if the initial expert is unwilling to assist. Our
strategy regeneration also allows for up to date modeling of the environment, where tasks
arise with great frequency (e.g. the attentional state of each expert may change a great
deal). As our validations are also projected in particular into this specific application, this
provides further evidence of the value of our approach for this particular medical challenge.
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